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The first chapter of this dissertation focuses on the heterogeneity in earnings
losses of displaced workers. A large literature shows that workers, on average, suffer
large and persistent earnings losses when displaced from a job. However, little atten-
tion has been devoted to the distribution of those losses. Using the 1994-2014 Current
Population Survey displaced worker surveys, I find that averages, whether from simple
summary statistics or calculated as expectations using ordinary least squares (OLS),
give a misleading and incomplete picture. The average loss in earnings in my sample
is 29%, compared with a median loss of just 12%. Using OLS, each year of tenure
is associated with an additional 1.3% reduction in earnings. Quantile regression es-
timates reveal that this magnitude of effect corresponds to the 80th percentile, and
that the effect of tenure at the median is just 0.7%. OLS estimates of the effect of
changing industries and occupations are also considerably larger than quantile regres-
sions at or below the median. I also attempt to correct for possible endogeneity in
the choice to switch industry and occupation. Two-stage least squares estimates yield
even larger estimated negative effects of changing industry and occupation than OLS,
but instrumental variables quantile regression estimates, using the model developed
by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005), suggest that the marginal effects on such losses
are highly concentrated among relatively few workers. Finally, I demonstrate that
there is a positive relationship between the magnitude of earnings losses and the level
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of skill associated with the pre-displacement jobs. Workers displaced from jobs in
the third skill quartile tend to find jobs lower down in the occupation distribution,
consistent with Autor and Dorn’s (2013) polarization hypothesis. However, workers
displaced from jobs in the middle of the distribution tend to find jobs in the middle
post-displacement, and workers displaced from jobs lower down in the distribution
tend to find jobs higher up.
The second chapter of this dissertation deals with the self-selection bias and
unobserved heterogeneity present in the estimation of the effect of economic inte-
gration agreements (EIA) on international trade flows. As detailed bilateral trade
flow data have become more readily available over time, panel data approaches to
empirical bilateral trade flows employing the gravity model have allowed researchers
to better estimate the impact of time varying trade costs. However, as pointed out
by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), there are numerous instances of zero (or
non-reported) bilateral trade flows in any given year. If these zero bilateral trade
flows arise from non-random events, the resulting selection may lead to biased coeffi-
cient estimates. We build on the contributions of Helpman, Melitz and Runbinstein
by using panel data techniques to assess the importance of selection over time. We
first show that the occurrences of zeros appear to be non-random. To control for
selection we employ a method that combines time varying probit specification with
a correlated random effects model in the second stage. We show that after control-
ling for selection and firm heterogeneity, the inclusion of bilateral fixed effects has a
modest impact on the measured effects of free trade agreements. To our knowledge,
we are the first to apply this technique to the gravity literature.
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Chapter 1
The Distribution of Earnings




Estimating the effect of involuntary, non-performance related job loss on earn-
ings has received considerable attention from labor economists for almost three decades.
In one of the earliest studies, Podgursky and Swaim (1987) found that though the me-
dian loss in earnings of workers displaced from their jobs was between 5-10%, there
was a high variation in those losses with a substantial minority of workers experi-
encing extremely large losses. Despite this documented variation, studies ever since
have mostly neglected the distribution of post-displacement losses and have focused
only on the conditional means. In this paper, I show that only concentrating on
the means give us an incomplete picture, and provide a richer, more comprehensive
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characterization of the post-displacement loss in earnings.
Using data from the 1994-2014 Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) supplements
to the Current Population Survey (CPS), and employing quantile regressions, I es-
timate the entire conditional distribution of the earnings losses experienced by the
displaced workers. I find that the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of the mean
loss, at 16%, corresponds to the 60th quantile of the loss distribution. In contrast
to the conditional mean, the quantile regression estimate of the loss at the median
is only about 7.4%. However, at the 75th quantile, the estimated loss is more than
double the mean loss at 37%. On the other hand, at the 25th quantile, there is an
estimated gain in earnings of 13.5%. Therefore, the conditional mean loss is signifi-
cantly smaller than the estimated losses at the upper tail, and is considerable larger
than the bulk of the losses across the distribution.
The estimated effect of an additional year of pre-displacement firm tenure on
losses can be interpreted as the extent of firm-specific human capital lost due to
displacement. I find that the conditional mean effect of tenure is to increase losses by
1.3%. However, this effect is largely concentrated at the upper tail of the conditional
loss distribution. While the mean effect, from OLS, corresponds to the effect on the
80th quantile of the distribution, the estimated effect is much smaller at the median,
at only 0.7%.
Prior research has found the losses to be affected by the worker’s decision
to switch industries and occupations, post-displacement. This decision depends on,
among other things, the worker’s pre-displacement industry and occupation match
qualities, which are unobservable. These match qualities, along with the post-displacement
match qualities, also affect the worker’s post-displacement losses, making the industry-
and occupation-switching decisions endogenous, and therefore, potentially biasing the
effects estimated using OLS. To correct for this potential endogeneity, I follow Stock
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(1998) and Bleakely and Lin (2012), and use employment share of pre-displacement
industry and occupation to instrument for the industry- and occupation-switch de-
cision. Workers displaced from smaller industries (and occupations) are more likely
to switch-industries than those displaced from larger industries. When I correct for
this potential endogeneity, I find that OLS significantly underestimates the extent
of industry- and occupation-specific human capital lost. Correcting for endogeneity
using two stage least squares (2SLS) increases the conditional mean losses associated
with industry switching from 13.4% to about 26%, and the effect of switching occu-
pations on losses rises from 7% to about 13%, although the latter effect isn’t precisely
estimated. To account for self-selection of workers into their post-displacement oc-
cupations, I also use the correction function approach from Dahl (2002). I find that
workers employed in technical occupations experience the largest losses from switching
industries, at 30%, while those employed in precision production occupations experi-
ence the smallest losses, at 3.7%. To correct for the endogeniety of switching industries
and occupations over the entire conditional distribution of post-displacement losses, I
use the model from Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) to estimate conditional quantile
effects with instrumental variables. The conditional mean effect of switching either
industries or occupations (from 2SLS) is smaller than the losses at the upper tail of
the loss distribution. However, the effects are not precisely estimated.
I also examine how losses vary with the ranking of the worker’s pre-displacement
occupation on the occupation skill percentile. Using the occupation skill percentile
from Autor and Dorn (2013), I find that the losses increase with occupational skills.
The estimated conditional mean loss for the highest skilled workers are in excess of
20%, while those for the least skilled workers stand at about 8%. In their paper,
Autor and Dorn show that the US labor market has witnessed polarization of em-
ployment and earnings growth since 1980s. Employment at the upper tail of the skill
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distribution has grown rapidly as a result of skill biased technical change, which also
caused the wages in this part of the distribution to rise sharply. With this increase
in wages, there was an increase in demand for low skilled in-person services, causing
employment growth in the lower tail of the skill distribution to also increase. Autor
and Dorn found that despite this increased demand, the growth in wages in these
occupations did not keep pace with the increase in wages at the upper tail of the skill
distribution. They argue that this could be attributed to the downward movement of
workers displaced, due to computerization of routine tasks, from occupations in the
the middle of the skill distribution. However, post-displacement employment pattern
in the displaced workers survey shows limited evidence of such hollowing out in the
middle of the skill distribution. Workers displaced from medium skilled occupations
do not all move down in occupational skills, post-displacement. There is in fact an
evidence of mean reversion in skills, upon displacement, with workers displaced from
lower skilled occupations moving up in skills and those displaced from higher skilled
occupations moving down in skills.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 provides a review
of the literature on earning losses of displaced workers, and Section 1.3 describes
the canonical model of wage determination. Section 1.4 describes the data used and
Section 1.5 provides a descriptive evidence of the heterogeneity present in the post-
displacement earnings losses. Section 1.6 presents the estimation results from quantile
regressions using typical covariates from the literature. Section 1.7 discusses the
endogeneity issues associated with industry and occupation switching, and presents
the results using 2SLS estimation, as well as the Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005)
model of instrumental variable quantile regressions. Section 1.8 classifies the post-
displacement outcomes based on the worker’s pre-displacement occupational skills,
and Section 1.9 concludes the paper.
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1.2 Literature Review
Displaced workers and their post-displacement earnings have been the focus
of numerous studies in the literature. This literature can be divided into studies that
use the DWS data, and studies that use other national datasets such as the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) or the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth
(NLSY), or other state level administrative datasets. Table 1.1 lists the studies that
use DWS data to characterize earnings losses and Table 1.2 lists the studies that use
other datasets.
1.2.1 Studies using Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) data
Using DWS 1984, Podgursky and Swaim (1987) identified factors that af-
fect reemployment earnings of displaced workers and found that proportionate losses
tend to rise with prior earnings. They also found that greater tenure at the pre-
displacement job reduced conditional mean wages of blue-collar male workers by 0.6%,
and staying in the same industry or occupation post-displacement reduced the mag-
nitude of this loss, by 19.8% and 8.5% respectively. Neither the effect of tenure, nor
of staying in the same industry or occupation, was significant for female workers.
Using 1984-86 DWS data, Topel (1990) estimated that a blue-collar worker displaced
from a manufacturing job experienced an average earnings loss of 20%. Each addi-
tional year of tenure increased the mean losses by 1.3%, while switching industries
(or occupations) increases these losses by about 12%.
Using DWS data from 1984-88, Carrington (1993) found displaced workers’
average weekly wage to be about 11.5% lower and these losses increased with pre-
displacement tenure and experience. He attributed the earnings losses to industrial,
occupational and locational downturns. Workers displaced from declining industries,
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occupations or states experienced larger losses and these losses were even larger for
workers that switched industries. Using DWS 1984-90, Neal (1995) compared the
losses of workers that switched industries post-displacement with those that stayed
in the same industry. He found that among men that switched industries, tenure
increases the mean loss by 1.5%, while among those that didn’t switch, the effect was
only 0.7%.
Farber (1993) argued that the post-displacement earnings loss has two compo-
nents: a) lower earnings at the new job, and b) the lost increment in wages that would
have occurred over time at the previous job had the worker not been displaced. Us-
ing data from DWS 1984-92 in conjunction with a synthetic sample of non-displaced
workers constructed from the merged outgoing rotation group (MORG) files of the
Current Population Survey (CPS), he found that displaced workers’ real weekly earn-
ings were, on average, 11% lower than those of the non-displaced workers.1 Farber
(2011) extended this analysis to cover DWS from 1984-2010 and found that these
losses varied significantly with business cycles.
1.2.2 Studies Using Other Data Sources
Several studies using data other than from DWS have also been conducted
to examine the consequences of job displacement. Since DWS is not a longitudinal
dataset, analysis of longer-term effects of displacement on workers’ earnings using
these data is not possible. Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993), in their seminal
work, constructed a mass-layoff sample using administrative data on Pennsylvanian
workers for the 1974-86 period. They found that average quarterly earnings of dis-
placed workers were about 40% lower a year after displacement, and about 25% lower
1However, as John Pencavel in his comment to Farber (1993) noted: the simple change in earnings,
as computed by other researchers, comes close to the difference-in-difference estimator of Farber
(1993).
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six years after displacement than what they would have earned had they not been
displaced. Furthermore, for workers displaced from and reemployed in the manu-
facturing sector, the mean longer-term earnings loss wasn’t affected by switching
industries and ranged between 16% to 18%. These losses were significantly higher, of
the order of 38%, for workers displaced from but not reemployed in the manufactur-
ing sector. Couch and Placzek (2010) examined a mass-layoff sample of Connecticut
workers for the period 1993-2004 and estimated short-term losses in quarterly earn-
ings of about 33% and longer-term losses of about 15%. Mean losses estimated using
state-level administrative datasets tend to be larger than those estimated using DWS
data because these losses are affected by local factors and downturns. Stevens et al
(1994), using administrative data for the states of Missouri, Pennsylvania and South
Carolina over the period 1977-83, concluded that the consequences of displacement
were more adverse in the more industrialized states, and cautioned against using data
from a single state to generalize the effects of displacement across US.
Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, Topel (1990), Ruhm
(1991) and Stevens (1997) also found that the post-displacement losses tend to per-
sist overtime. For example, Topel (1990) using 1968-85 data found that average
weekly earnings of male displaced workers fell by about 18% in the year following
job loss and remained 15% below their pre-displacement level even four years after
displacement. White (2010) using data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) spanning 1979-2000, showed that the displaced workers not only experience
lower earnings post-displacement, but also tend to experience a reduction in earnings
before displacement, compared to the workers that don’t get displaced. He found that
these workers, on average, lost 10.8% in earnings during the period four years prior
through five years following displacement, as compared to the non-displaced workers.
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1.3 A Model of Wage Determination
The theory of human capital accumulation and the differences in accumulated
human capital across workers can be used to explain the post-displacement earnings
losses. Becker (1962) distinguished between two kinds of human capital – general
and specific. General human capital is useful in many firms and is easily transferable
across firms. As a result, the workers reap benefits from these skills regardless of the
firm they are employed in, and retain the part of their earnings that is associated with
these skills even after displacement. Specific human capital, on the other hand, is
specific to a job and is not easily transferable to other firms. Therefore, an involuntary,
non-performance related separation of the worker from that job will cause the worker
to lose all the earnings that were associated with these firm-specific skills. The longer
a worker remains employed at a firm, the larger is his stock of specific human capital
and the greater will be the post-displacement losses. Similarly, to the extent that
workers also accumulate skills that are specific to the industry or occupation, they
may incur higher losses by switching industries, or occupations, post-displacement.
Using the Mincerian earnings function (Mincer (1975)), as augmented by Neal
(1995), worker i’s pre-displacement weekly earnings can be expressed as follows:






i + Xiβ + εi, (1.1)
where, ln(W prei ) is the natural log of worker i’s pre-displacement weekly earnings;






i are his pre-displacement
firm, industry and occupation tenure; Xi is a vector of observable time-invariant
worker characteristics such as education, gender, race, etc.; and εi represents the
unobservable characteristics affecting i’s pre-displacement weekly earnings, such as
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individual ability. Wages are expected to rise with experience because of accumulation
of general skills, and wages also rise with job seniority and industry/occupation tenure
due to accumulation of firm-specific and industry-/ occupation-specific skills.
Upon displacement, worker i loses the return to firm-specific human capi-
tal associated with firm tenure. The worker may also lose the returns to industry-
and occupation-specific skills if the worker switches industries and occupations, post-
displacement. If this is the case, post-displacement wages are equal to:
ln(W posti ) = α
′Expi + Xiβ
′ + ε′i, (1.2)





i ) = −θ1T
f
i − θ2T di − θ3T ci + εi, (1.3)
The DWS datasets do not include information on a worker’s industry and
occupation tenure. As a result, typically the following alternative specification for
equation (1.3) is used to estimate the post-displacement losses (Podgursky and Swaim

















1 if changed occupation
0 Otherwise
;
and, θ̃1 = −θ1 < 0; θ̃2 = −θ2 < 0; θ̃3 = −θ3 < 0. Using OLS on equation (1.4) gives
us an estimate of the conditional mean change in earnings experienced by workers
after displacement, under the assumption that εi is independently, identically and
normally distributed with mean zero and an unknown variance. This conditional
mean function is negative, i.e., workers, on average, experience a loss in earnings
post-displacement due to the loss of returns to accumulated specific human capital:
E[∆ln(Wi)|Ti, Di] = θ̃1T fi + θ̃2Ddi + θ̃3Dci < 0. (1.5)
Therefore, a negative least squares coefficient estimate in (1.4) would imply that a unit
increase in the corresponding variable is associated with greater average losses, while
a positive coefficient will imply smaller average losses. For example, the estimated
coefficient on firm-tenure (θ̂1), implies that an additional year of tenure at the pre-
displacement firm causes the post-displacement conditional mean loss to be greater by
θ̂1. Similarly, under the classical least squares assumptions, the estimated coefficients
on industry- and occupation-switch dummy variables (θ̂2 and θ̂3) provide an estimate
of the losses of industry- and occupation-specific human capital due to displacement.
1.3.1 Empirical Model for Quantile Regressions
Extending the above framework to quantile regression is straightforward. Equa-
tion (1.4) can be augmented to characterizes the change in earnings of displaced
10







i + Ziβ̃τ + εiτ , (1.6)
where, 0 < τ < 1 indicates the proportion of workers with change in earnings below
the quantile τ ; and Zi is a vector of observable individual characteristics that affect
the change in post-displacement earnings such as duration of unemployment after
displacement, and the number of years since displacement. Among other things,
quantile regression estimates help us to quantify and compare the returns to tenure or
industry-specific human capital for workers throughout the loss distribution, including
at the median. The consequence of displacement at the median is more relevant than
the mean effect, which is central to OLS estimation, because of the non-symmetric
nature of the earnings loss distribution and the presence of outliers that pull the mean
losses up. Section 1.5 provides a descriptive evidence of this variation in DWS data.
Since the quantile regression model minimizes a weighted sum of absolute deviations,
the estimated coefficients are not sensitive to outliers in ∆ln(Wi).
2 Using quantile
regression we can estimate the conditional quantile function of post-displacement
change in earnings, τ [.], for each τ as follows:
τ [∆ln(Wi)|Ti, Di,Zi] = θ̃1τTfi + θ̃2τDdi + θ̃3τDci + Ziβ̃τ , (1.7)
where, the estimated coefficients are equal to the marginal effect of the corresponding
regressors on ∆ln(Wi) on the τ
th conditional quantile of ∆ln(Wi). For example, a
coefficient estimate on pre-displacement firm tenure at τ = 0.25 (θ̂1,0.25) measures the
effect of one additional year of pre-displacement tenure on earnings change on the
2See appendix A for a summary of the quantile regression model.
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25th quantile of the conditional earnings change distribution. By changing the value
of τ between 0 and 1 we can express the entire conditional distribution of ∆ln(Wi)
in terms of Ti, Di, and Zi.
1.4 Data
I use data from the Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) supplement to the
January Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). The survey provides information about workers that were dis-
placed from their jobs any time in the 3 years preceding the survey. BLS de-
fines displaced workers as persons 20 years of age and older who lost jobs, from
establishments where they were employed for at least 3 years, because their
plant or company closed or moved, there was insufficient work for them to do,
or their position or shift was abolished. I use CEPR Uniform Extracts of the
DWS 1994-2010, available at http://ceprdata.org/cps-uniform-data-extracts/
cps-displaced-worker-survey/cps-dws-data/, and add in data from the surveys
of 2012 and 2014 available at http://www.nber.org/data/cps_basic.html.
The sample of displaced workers from 1994-2014 DWS consists of 18,810 obser-
vations. These surveys provide information about the post-displacement employment
and earnings outcomes of only those displaced workers that were employed on the
survey date. In my sample, about 65-70% of the displaced workers were employed,
during each survey. Of these, about 91% were displaced from full-time, non-farm
jobs, and I concentrate only on these workers. Table 1.3 summarizes some of the
characteristics of these workers. About 28% were displaced from manufacturing sec-
tor, 15.5% from the trade sector, 8% from construction and another 8% from the
financial services sector. On average, a displaced worker worked for about 9 years at
12
the pre-displacement firm before getting displaced. However, the median tenure is
6 years, implying that though 50% of the displaced workers had a tenure between 3
and 6 years, a substantial minority of these workers had considerably longer tenures.
To make industry- and occupation-level comparisons over time, I use the 1990 cen-
sus industry and occupation coding system, which identifies 235 distinct industries,
and 367 distinct occupations. After displacement, approximately 64% of the workers
switched industries, while about 47% switched both, industries and occupations.
1.5 The Unconditional Distribution
The distribution of the post-displacement change in real earnings (2009 $) for
the full sample of displaced workers is shown in Figure 1.1.3 Note that because a
negative change in earnings implies an earnings loss, lower quantiles of the earnings
change distribution, i.e., lower values of τ on the x-axis, correspond to higher losses,
and vice versa. For example, the 25th quantile of the earnings change distribution
corresponds to the 75th quantile on the loss distribution. On average, workers dis-
placed between 1991 and 2013 experienced a loss in earnings amounting to 29%.
However, at the 75th quantile of the loss distribution, the losses were considerably
higher, at 49%. In contrast, the median losses were much smaller at only 12% and,
at the 25th percentile there was a gain in earnings of 7%. Therefore, majority of
displaced workers experienced losses that were less than half the magnitude of the
mean loss. At the same time, there exists a minority of workers that experienced
losses that are over 1.5 times the size of the mean loss.
The variation in losses by survey years is shown in Figure 1.2. These losses tend
to be higher during the recession years. For example, during the 2001-03 recession,
3All earnings have been deflated by 2009 Personal Consumption Expenditure Deflator.
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the average losses were at 35%, considerably higher than the average of 16% during
1997-98. During the Great Recession, the average losses were the highest, at 41%, and
even four years after the recession, the average losses of displaced workers remained
some what high at about 26%.4 In order to put these average losses in perspective,
Figure 1.3 shows the median, the 75th, and the 25th quantiles of the loss distribution
along with the mean losses, for each survey year. In every instance, the magnitude
of the median loss is at least half that of the mean loss. The median loss in the
2000 survey data was only a fourth of the mean loss at 4%. Even during the 2007-
09 recession, when the mean losses were the largest, the median loss was only 20%,
and it remained around that level in the 2012 survey before falling to about 10%
in 2014. In the presence of such wide variation in losses, the mean by itself fails to
fully characterize the losses of displaced workers. As a result, using standard OLS
to describe the importance of specific human capital in post-displacement losses may
not provide a comprehensive view of these effects.
1.6 Quantile Regression Estimates
Quantile regression estimates for the full sample of displaced workers are pre-
sented in Table 1.4, at a select few values of τ (0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90), where once
again, lower values of τ , correspond to higher earnings losses. Column 1 of the table
reports the OLS estimates to provide a comparison of conditional quantiles with the
conditional mean effects. Using OLS, I find that each additional year of tenure is
associated with 1.3% additional losses. However, at the highest decile of the loss
4DWS data, being a retrospective source of information, could be subject to recall bias, i.e., most
costly events may be more likely to be reported, and telescopic bias, i.e., respondents may be more
likely to assign dates to events that are closer to the survey date (Akerlof and Yellen 1985). Topel
(1990), however, compared the sample of displaced workers from DWS and PSID, and found no
evidence of telescoping or recall bias in the DWS data.
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distribution (τ = 0.10), tenure is associated with 2% additional losses, while at the
lowest decile (τ = 0.90), it is associated with only 1% additional losses.
Though the estimated effects on industry- and occupation- switch may not
be interpreted as causal effects because of the presence of endogeneity, discussed in
the next section, the effects do reveal the heterogeneity across the loss distribution.
Switching industries is associated with a conditional mean effect of 13.4% additional
losses, but at the median, the effect is much smaller at only 6.1%. At the third
quartile of the loss distribution (τ = 0.25), however, the estimated effect is higher at
16%, which further goes up to 26% at the highest decile. Switching occupations also
has a more pronounced effect on the higher quantiles, around 18.8% at the highest
decile and around 12% at the third quartile, than at the median, at 4.6%.
The estimated effect of years since displacement on losses is negative across the
distribution. The longer the duration since displacement, the lower are the expected
losses, other things remaining constant. This is because potentially, either the worker
devotes more time to job search and is able to find a better job-/earnings match,
or the worker is able to accumulate new specific skills at the new job, causing the
reported post-displacement earnings to be higher than for an observationally similar
worker who is displaced closer to the survey date. The conditional mean effect of
an additional year since displacement is 4% lower losses, while at the median the
estimated effect is only a 1.5% reduction in losses. At the highest decile the effect is
7.7%, and at the lowest decile it is 3.2% lower losses.
In addition to time since displacement, the number of weeks a worker spends
without a job after being displaced also affects the worker’s wages. The longer a
worker is without work, the higher are his expected losses because of potential de-
preciation of general human capital. The estimated mean effect of an additional
week spent without work on earnings losses is the same as that at the median –
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each additional week increases the losses by about 0.5% – and the effect doesn’t vary
significantly across the loss distribution.
The OLS model predicts that displaced workers experience a conditional mean
loss of about 16.1%, while the predicted loss at the median of the loss distribution
(τ = 0.50) is only 7.4%. At the highest decile of the loss distribution, the predicted
loss goes up to 78.5%, while at the lowest decile the predicted gain is about 39%.
Therefore, the conditional mean loss estimated using OLS corresponds to the third
quartile of the loss distribution and not to the losses of the majority of the displaced
workers.
The quantile plots for the slope estimates of tenure, industry-, and occupation-
switch dummies, with their 95% confidence intervals, are presented in Figure 1.4.
To make comparisons easier, the OLS point estimates for the covariates have been
superimposed on these graphs. The graphs help driving the point home that the
effect of specific human capital on losses is more pronounced at the upper tail of the
loss distribution, and the estimated effects from OLS do not provide the complete
picture.
1.6.1 Does College Insulate Against Post-Displacement
Losses?
In order to capture the variation in earnings losses by education level of dis-
placed workers, the quantile regression model was re-estimated separately for high
school and college graduates. Selected coefficients from these regressions are reported
in Table 1.5, and the quantile plots of the estimated effects separately for high school
and college graduates are presented in Figure 1.5.5 The mean effect of an additional
5Refer to Appendix B for the full set of results.
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year of pre-displacement tenure is only marginally different between the two groups –
1.1% for high school graduates and 1.5% for college graduates – and the effect at the
median of the loss distribution is the same for both, at 0.8%. However, at the highest
decile, the effect of tenure is significantly higher among college graduates, at 2.9%,
compared to only 1.4% for high school graduates. Therefore, college graduates with
the highest losses are the ones most affected by the loss of firm-specific human capital.
The conditional effect of switching industries is greater on high school graduates than
on college graduates across the entire loss distribution. At the median, switching
industries increases losses by 20.8% among high school graduates, and 11.9% among
college graduates. Switching occupations is associated with 5.1% additional losses at
the median, for high school graduates, and 3.4% for college graduates. However, at
the highest decile, changing occupation is associated significantly higher losses among
college graduates, at 37.3%, compared to only 15.4% for the high school graduates.
Predicted losses using OLS were higher for college graduates, at about 19% than for
high school graduates, at about 16%. However, at the median, predicted loss for
college graduates, at 4.5%, was less than half that of high school graduates, at 9.4%.
The higher predicted mean loss among college graduates compared to high school
graduates is mostly driven by significantly higher losses in the upper quantile. Col-
lege degree, therefore, seems to cushion the effect of displacement among the majority
of the workers. However, at the upper tail, the losses are more pronounced for the
workers with college degree. This may be because some college degrees are investment
in specific rather than general human capital.
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1.7 Endogeneity of Industry and Occupation
Switching
1.7.1 The Argument
Consider the pre-displacement wage equation (1.1):






i + Xiβ + εifdc (1.8)
where, εifdc represents the unobservable characteristics that affect a worker’s wages.
Assuming that this unobservable component can be decomposed additively, we can
express εifdc as:
εifdc = γif + δid + κic + υi + µifdc (1.9)
where, γif represents the unobservables affecting wages that are specific to the worker-
firm pair and can be thought of as firm-match quality; δid and κic represent the
industry- and occupation-match quality; υi represents the unobservable individual
characteristics that affect wages, such as individual’s ability, and µifdc represents
other random shocks affecting wages.
The unobserved match quality variables are likely to be correlated with the re-
spective firm, industry, and occupation tenure variables in equation (1.8) (Abraham
and Farber (1987), Topel (1991)). For example, given a worker’s ability, a better
industry-match quality might imply greater accumulation of tenure at that industry.
Such a correlation would make the worker’s decision to switch industries (or occupa-
tions) endogenous in the change in earnings model. Specifically, upon displacement,
a worker will choose to switch industries (or occupations) only if not switching would
lead to worse earnings outcomes. Specifically, if δid′ denotes the unobserved post-
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displacement industry-match quality, then the worker will switch industries only if
the benefits of improvements in industry-match quality, given by (δid′ − δid), exceed





1 if (δid′ − δid) > θ2T di
0 Otherwise
,
The decision to switch occupations is, similarly, related to the occupation-match
quality at the pre-displacement job. The workers, therefore, select into the industries
and occupations based on their unobserved match-qualities. The resultant selection
bias will lead the coefficient estimates from OLS to be inconsistent. Due to the likely
positive relationship between wages and industry-match quality, the effect of switching
industries on post-displacement earnings losses might be underestimated. To correct
for this potential endogeneity, instrumental variables are used to instrument for the
industry- and occupation-switch dummy variables. These instruments are discussed
in the next section.6
6The pre-displacement industry-/occupation-match quality are also potentially correlated with
the pre-displacement firm tenure. All else equal, a better industry-match would imply longer firm
tenure. This potential positive correlation might lead the losses attributable to firm-specific human
capital to be biased upwards. At the same time, the returns to industry-specific human capital
may be biased downwards. Prior literature has, in estimating the returns to industry- and occupa-
tion specific human capital, acknowledged this bias (for example, Sullivan (2010), Kambourov and
Manovskii (2009), Topel (1991)). However, given the limitations of the available data, the problem
remains unsolved in the literature. In the presence of such biases, the estimated losses associated
with industry- or occupation-specific capital will be underestimated and the results should be in-
terpreted as a lower bound for such losses. In contrast, the estimated firm-specific human capital
lost should be seen as an upper bound for such losses. The pre-displacement firm-tenure variable,
unlike the industry- and occupation-tenure, is not correlated with the unobservables affecting the
change in earnings post-displacement. This is because the separation from the pre-displacement firm
occurred as a result of the firm’s operating decisions and not due to a choice made by the worker.
Upon displacement, the worker’s choice of post-displacement firm (f ′) is based on the condition:
(γif ′ − γif ) > (γif∗ − γif ) ⇒ γif ′ > γif∗ ∀ f∗ 6= f ′, (1.10)
where f∗ represents any firm from the distribution of firms available to the worker to choose from.
The choice of post-displacement firm is, therefore, independent of the pre-displacement firm-match
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1.7.2 The Instruments
Following follow Stock (1998) and Bleakely and Lin (2012), I use the employ-
ment share of a worker’s pre-displacement industry (and occupation) in the total
employment as an instrument for the worker’s industry- (and occupation-) switch de-
cision. All else equal, it may be harder for workers displaced from smaller industries
(or occupations) to find employment in the same industry (or occupation), making
it more likely for them to switch industries. At the same time, the employment
shares don’t directly affect an individual worker’s wages and are unrelated to the
worker’s unobserved match quality. Employment shares as instruments for industry-
and occupation-switch dummy variables, thus, satisfy both the identification condi-
tions.
I use monthly CPS data to calculate the employment share of each industry
and occupation in total employment in the year of displacement. Table 1.6 provides
the mean displacement outcomes for workers by their pre-displacement industry em-
ployment share. A significantly high number of workers (7,185) were displaced from
industries with less than 0.5% employment share. Another 8,150 full-time workers
were displaced from industries with employment share in the range of 0.5-2%. The
probability that a worker switches industries seems to be negatively correlated with
the pre-displacement industry employment share, as expected. On average, 73% of
workers displaced from industries with less than 0.5% employment share switched
industries, while only 52% of those displaced from industries with employment shares
between 2% and 6% changed industries. The number is even lower at 41% for work-
ers displaced from industries that employed more than 6% of the labor force. The
95% confidence interval for these predicted means are not too wide, thus making
quality (γif ), which is correlated with the pre-displacement firm-tenure.
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the difference between the means across employment share levels significant. On the
other hand, the mean change in log weekly earnings are not too different across the
employment share levels and show no consistent pattern. Thus, pre-displacement
employment share is strongly related to a worker’s industry switching behavior, but
is not related to his post-displacement change in earnings. This provides evidence for
the suitability of pre-displacement industry employment share as a potentially good
instrument for the industry-switch dummy (Ddi ).
I also use as instruments the mean proportion of men and women that switch
industries, and those that switch occupations, after getting displaced from that indus-
try or occupation, in any given year. I do this to instrument for any other industry or
occupation wide shocks that might affect a worker’s probability to switch industries
or occupations. If a particular industry or occupation is hit by a random shock that
increases the proportion of switches away from it then the probability of switching
for a worker displaced from that industry or occupation is likely to increase as well.
Table 1.7 provides a summary of all the instruments used.
1.7.3 The Estimation Results – 2SLS
The first stage results from the 2SLS estimation using instrumental variables
are reported in Table 1.8. All the instruments have the expected sign, and using
Wooldridge’s robust score test of over-identifying restrictions, I was unable to reject
the null hypothesis that these instruments are valid at the 5% significance level. The
probability of switching industries (and occupations) is larger for workers displaced
from industries (or occupations), where a greater proportion of workers switch, and
smaller for workers displaced from industries (or occupations) with a larger employ-
ment share. Though, the effect of pre-displacement occupation share is not statis-
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tically significant, dropping this instrument doesn’t change the results so, for the
purpose of symmetry, I leave the instrument in the estimations.
Table 1.9 reports the results from the second stage in column (2), along with
the OLS estimates for comparison, in column (1). The 2SLS estimated effect of
switching industries, at 26%, is nearly double the OLS estimate of 13.4%. The 2SLS
estimated effect of switching occupations, at 12.9%, is also larger than the OLS effect
of 7.2%, although the 2SLS effect is not precisely estimated.
Column (3) reports the results after dropping the occupation-switch dummy,
which essentially implies assuming that switching occupations has no effect on the
conditional mean loss. This increases the effect of switching industries, while other
marginal effects remain unchanged. In column (4), I report results after dropping
the industry-switch dummy from the model, and adding back the occupation-switch
dummy variable. This increases the marginal effect of switching occupations on losses,
by over 5 times. These results suggest a positive correlation between switching in-
dustries and occupations, and the two are indeed positively correlated with 79% of
workers that switch industries also switch occupations, and vice versa. Columns
(5) and (6) report estimates from a model using a dummy variable for workers that
switched either industries or occupations, and a dummy variable for workers that
switched both industries and occupations. Switching either industries or occupations
is associated with 29% additional losses, compared to workers that switch neither,
while switching both the industry and the occupation increases the conditional mean
loss by 21%, compared to workers that don’t switch both.
I re-estimate the specifications in Table 1.9 using the employment share of the
worker’s pre-displacement industry, and occupation, in total employment of the state
to which the worker belonged. Because DWS only provides information about the
state of residence of the worker on the survey date, and no information about the state
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of residence when the worker was displaced, I restricted my sample to include only
those workers that reported to have not moved after displacement. These accounted
for about 88% of my sample of full-time displaced workers. In addition to the state
employment share of the pre-displacement industry (or occupation), following Stock
1998, I also use as instrument the change in that industry’s (or occupation’s) state
employment share, to account for any mass downsizing that may have occurred across
firms in that industry in any given state. If a particular industry is hit by an exogenous
shock leading most firms in that industry to close down then displacement from a
larger industry wouldn’t necessarily translate into a lower probability of switching
industries. The results from these regressions provide similar effects associated with
firm-, industry-, and occupation-specific human capital, and are reported in Appendix
C.
1.7.4 The Estimation Results – IV Quantile Regressions
I use the model developed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005), to estimate
quantile treatment effects in the presence of endogeneity. Their model is based on the
assumption of rank similarity, i.e., a worker’s expected ranking on the earnings change
distribution doesn’t vary systematically over the values of the endogenous variable.
The model allows for stochastic deviations in rank away from some common level and
assumes that these slippages are identically distributed for all values of the industry-
/occupation-switch dummy variable. This assumption implies that the worker selects
to switch industries or occupations without knowing the exact potential earnings loss,
but he may know the common level of loss and the distribution of slippages from that
common level. Using this rank similarity assumption, Chernozhukov and Hansen
(2005) impose a moment restriction for identification of quantile treatment effects.
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Prior empirical work using the instrumental variable quantile regression model
is limited and the literature is still developing in using this model. The avail-
able Stata routine (available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/christian.
hansen/research/) for estimating the model allows for only one endogenous vari-
able. I, therefore, use the model to estimate the earnings losses using an indicator
variable for workers that switched either industries or occupations. Table 1.10 reports
the results from this estimation for selected values of τ , and Figure 1.6 plots the co-
efficient estimates across the entire change in earnings distribution, along with their
95% confidence intervals. Though the estimated effects are noisy, switching either
industries or occupations has a larger negative effect on the change in earnings at the
tails of the distribution, than in the middle.
1.7.5 The Control Function Approach
Returns to firm- and industry-specific human capital may vary with the occu-
pational choice of a worker. As a result, the earnings losses of a displaced worker will
depend not only on the worker’s decision to switch occupations, but also on his pre-
as well as post-displacement occupation choice. For example, a worker moving from a
managerial occupation to a technical occupation will potentially have a very different
post-displacement experience than a worker moving from a managerial occupation to
a service occupation. Similarly, switching industries will have a heterogeneous effect
on workers depending on their pre- as well as post-displacement occupation. For
instance, a day laborer may experience a smaller loss in returns to industry-specific
skills if he chooses to switch industries upon displacement, than a worker in a techni-
cal occupation. Using the mobility and earnings model in Dahl (2002), I re-estimate
the losses of workers after controlling for the occupation-switching choices available
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to them post-displacement.7
I divide the occupations into five broad categories based on the CPS 1990
classification: Managerial and Professional Specialty Occupations, Technical, Sales
and Administrative Support Occupations; Service Occupations; Precision Produc-
tion, Craft and Repair Occupations, and Operators, Fabricators and Laborers. Table
1.11 presents the regression estimates for each of the 5 occupation categories using
the control functions (CF) to correct for selection, along with the respective OLS
estimates for comparison. The losses associated with switching industries rise, once
corrected for self-selection, pointing towards the bias in OLS estimations. For workers
that selected into technical, sales or administrative support occupations, switching
industries is associated with 30% additional losses, while for those in managerial oc-
cupations, the effect is 20%. The upward bias in the OLS estimates maybe the result
of the workers’ attempt to minimize their post-displacement losses, by selecting into
occupations that match better with their abilities and other unobservable characteris-
tics. In service occupations, switching industries was associated with 16.1% additional
losses, however, this effect is not precisely estimated, neither are the estimates for pre-
cision production workers and laborers. Workers’ self-selection into post-displacement
occupations doesn’t seem to bias the estimates on pre-displacement tenure, which do
not change after the addition of correction functions in to the estimation. Each
additional year of pre-displacement tenure is associated with 1.6% additional losses
among workers in technical occupations, while among those in precision production
occupations, the effect is only 0.5%. The estimates, therefore, suggest that the loss
of returns to firm- and industry-specific skills is highest among workers employed in
technical occupations.
7Refer to Appendix D for a detailed exposition of this model.
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1.8 Occupational Skill Rankings and Losses
Autor and Dorn (2013) show that the US labor market has, since 1980s, wit-
nessed polarization of employment and earnings, i.e., growth in employment and
wages remained concentrated at the top- and bottom-end of the occupational skill
distribution, while occupations in the middle witnessed stagnation or even a decline in
their shares. They argue that the jobs in the middle of the skill distribution were more
routine in nature and could be easily codified. This, along with the continuously de-
clining costs of computerization, led to a substitution of computers in the production
process, causing a decline in demand for medium skilled workers that were previously
performing these routine tasks. Computerization, due to its complementarity in pro-
duction with the higher skilled workers, led to an increase in demand for and wages
of workers at the top end of the occupation skill distribution. This increase in wages
at the top end, and consumption preferences that favor variety, led to an increase in
demand for low-skill in-person services such as those of bar-tenders, restaurant meals,
haircuts, etc., causing wages to rise in the lower tail of the occupation-skill distribu-
tion. Furthermore, Autor and Dorn argue that workers in the middle of the skill
distribution find it easier to move down rather than up the occupation skill ranking.
As a result of this, wage growth at the lower tail of the skill distribution was only
modest and not as significant as in the top-most occupation skill quartile.
The phenomenon of polarization may have some effect on the post-
displacement earnings and employment outcomes of the displaced workers. More
specifically, it is of interest to understand and compare the losses of workers that
were displaced from low and high skilled occupations, i.e., occupations that experi-
enced rapid growth, with those of displaced from medium skilled occupations, i.e.,
occupations that stagnated. In order to classify the post-displacement losses of work-
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ers by the skill intensity of their pre-displacement occupations, I match the 3-digit
census occupation codes in DWS to the measure of occupational skills used by Autor
and Dorn (2013). Their measure of skills uses the 1980 occupation mean wage to
construct a ranking of occupations over a skill percentile.
Table 1.12 reports the results from 2SLS estimation of losses by the pre-
displacement occupation skill quartiles. The conditional mean effect of each addi-
tional year of pre-displacement tenure, at 1.7% additional losses, is the largest among
workers displaced from occupations in the highest quartile of the skill distribution. In
contrast, the effect is only 0.7% to 1% in the middle of the skill distribution. Switch-
ing industries is associated with largest additional losses in the lowest skill quartile,
at 60.3%, while in the third skill quartile the effect is only 17.2%. The predicted
losses are the highest in the third and fourth skill quartiles, at around 19%, while
in the lowest quartile, the losses are just a third in magnitude, at 6.4%. To capture
the heterogeneity in losses across workers displaced from different occupation skill
quartiles, and also the variation in losses over the loss distribution, I re-estimate the
losses using quantile regressions, separately for each occupation skill quartile. Table
1.13 reports the predicted losses from these regressions at selected values of τ , along
with the predicted losses from OLS and 2SLS estimations for comparison.8 Compared
to the conditional mean loss, predicted losses at the median of the loss distribution
were less than half in magnitude in each of the skill quartiles. The predicted loss
at the median was only about 2.3% in the lowest skill quartile, and about 10.3% in
the 3rd skill quartile. At the 90th quantile of the loss distribution, the losses ranged
between 76% to 78% for workers across skill quartiles, except for workers in the third
skill quartile, where the losses were about 89%. In contrast, at the 10th quantile of
the loss distribution, the gain in earnings experienced by displaced workers was high-
8See appendix E for the full set of quantile regression results, by occupational skill quartiles.
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est among those displaced from the lowest skill quartile (at 66%), and lowest among
those displaced from the highest skill quartiles.
To better understand the lower losses and higher gains in earnings experienced
by workers displaced from the first quartile of the occupation skill distribution, the
movement of workers across occupation skill percentiles is mapped in Figure 1.7. The
horizontal axis ranks the pre-displacement occupations over the skill percentile, as
measured by Autor and Dorn (2013), and the vertical axis measures the deviation of
the average post-displacement skill level from each of these pre-displacement occupa-
tion skill percentiles. If each displaced worker was, on the survey date, employed in an
occupation with the same skill requirement as that of his pre-displacement job, then
the deviations would have been zero and all the points would lie on the horizontal line
depicting zero deviation. Points below this line imply that workers on average moved
down in skills, while points above imply that they moved up, after being displaced
from a job belonging to a given occupation skill percentile.
The phenomenon of polarization, as explained by Autor and Dorn (2013) would
imply that the job losers in the middle of the occupation skill distribution, on aver-
age, move down in skills. However, as Figure 1.7 illustrates, the sample of workers
displaced between 1991-2013, provides limited evidence of this. Workers displaced
in the middle of the skill distribution don’t all move down. There is in fact a mean
reversion in skills post-displacement. Those in the third quartile of the skill distribu-
tion seem to be moving down and those in the second quartile seem to be moving up.
Significant gains, in terms of the skill intensity of post-displacement job, were made
among those that lost jobs at the lowest quartile of the skill distribution, while those
that got displaced from highest skilled occupations suffered drastic reductions in the
skill requirement of the post-displacement job.
Figure 1.8 reproduces the relationship depicted in Figure 1.7 separately for
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each of the survey years and the pattern observed is consistent across years. An
explanation for this phenomenon may lie in the differences in the levels of general
and specific human capital accumulated at low vs high skilled occupations. At very
low skilled occupations, the skills that are accumulated may not be very specific to
the particular firm or occupation. Instead, these skills may be transferable across
occupations in the vicinity of the pre-displacement occupation skill percentile. This
allows the workers to, on average, move up the skill ranking after displacement. The
fact that an involuntary separation from the job caused this move is indicative of
potentially high search or mobility costs. These costs could have been high enough to
nullify any gains the worker would have made by voluntarily moving to a relatively
higher skilled occupation, thus discouraging the move. This tendency of workers that
are displaced from the first occupation skill quartile to move up the skill ranking
explains part of the lower losses and higher gains in earnings experienced by these
workers.
In comparison to occupations in the lower tail of the skill distribution, workers
employed in occupations at the upper tail may experience substantial investment in
human capital that is very specific to that particular job or occupation. Therefore,
over time as more of these skills are accumulated, these workers witness an increase
in their earnings, and the share of returns to specific human capital in their earnings
becomes larger and larger. For these workers, job displacement would imply greater
earnings losses because they have to forgo a larger proportion of their earnings. Fur-
thermore, because the skills gained in the pre-displacement job were specific to that
job, these workers also fall down in the occupational skill ranking, post-displacement.
Therefore, the higher losses experienced by the highest skilled workers can be ex-




The significant variation in the distribution of losses across displaced workers,
as shown in Figure 1.1, highlights the need to look beyond the mean, and at the entire
distribution of post-displacement losses. The literature on the experience of displaced
workers has mainly concentrated on the conditional mean effect of certain covariates
on the losses. These estimates, though useful in telling us about the average post-
displacement experience, do very little in explaining the losses at the upper tail of the
distribution. Using quantile regressions, I find that the OLS predicted conditional
mean loss, at 16%, is double the magnitude of the predicted loss at the median,
at 7.4%. However, a substantial minority of workers experience losses that were
considerably larger than the mean. For example, at the 75th quantile, the predicted
losses are over 36%, and these losses go up to over 78% at the 90th quantile. Using
the model developed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) to estimate conditional
quantile effects with instrumental variables, I find that the effect of firm-, industry-
and occupation specific human capital on losses is concentrated at the tails of the loss
distribution. For example, the conditional mean effect of tenure, at 1.3%, corresponds
to the effect at the 80th quantile of the loss distribution, and is almost double the
effect at the median.
The post-displacement earnings losses also vary considerably based on the skill
intensity of the pre-displacement occupations. Using the skill percentiles computed by
Autor and Dorn (2013) to rank occupations, I find that the predicted losses are lower
for the workers displaced from the lowest occupation skill quartile, and the greatest
in the third quartile, across the entire distribution of losses. The lower losses among
workers displaced in the first skill quartile are associated with an upward movement of
these workers on the skill percentile, after displacement. On the other hand, workers
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displaced from the upper tail of the skill distribution, on average, moved down in
skills. This movement, provides limited evidence of labor market polarization as
explained by Autor and Dorn (2013) who argue that the workers displaced in the
middle of the distribution take up jobs in the lower tail of the skill distribution.
The tendency of the workers in the lower tail to rise up on the skill percentile
may be evidence of accumulation of more general skills in these occupations, as com-
pared to occupations at the top-end of the skill distribution. However, it could also
be a simple case of mean reversion where workers that had a relatively bad draw
of occupation in the first round, did better after displacement, while those that had
a particularly good draw, did worse. Another explanation relates post-displacement
outcomes to occupational downturns. Workers that faired poorly could have been dis-
placed in a particularly bad year for that occupation. Further research into the post-
displacement movement across the occupation skill percentile is, therefore, needed
to make more conclusive claims about the patterns observed in this paper. Another
avenue for future research relates to overcoming the shortcomings of DWS data. Be-
cause these data are not longitudinal, it is impossible to track worker experiences
over long periods of time, and therefore, only short-run effects of displacement were
analyzed in this paper. Furthermore, DWS only provides information on a selected
sample of displaced workers – workers that are re-employed on the survey date. The
estimated losses may be larger if the losses of those that remain unemployed longer
could also be estimated. It would, therefore, be useful to extend the methodology in
this paper to datasets such as PSID or NLSY, to get a more comprehensive picture
of the consequences of displacement.
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1979-1983 Full time males
aged 20-65
years
None (+)4 (-) (-)










Carrington (1993) 1979-1987 Full time males
aged 21-63
years
None 11.5% (-) (-) (-)
































Mean unless specified otherwise.
2 A negative effect implies greater pre-displacement tenure is associated with greater earnings loss.
3 A negative effect implies that change in occupation or industry is associated with greater earnings loss.
4 Pre-displacement tenure positively affects post-displacement wages..
5 Excludes displacement from construction sector and includes job displacement only due to establishment closing.
6 Less negative for industry stayers than industry switchers, for both men and women.
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Table 1.2: Studies on Post-Displacement Earnings Losses Using Datasets Other than
DWS
Earnings Losses
Study Period Treatment Group Control
Group
Short-Run Long-Run
Studies using administrative datasets
Jacobson, LaLonde and
Sullivan (1993)





















Studies using other datasets
Topel (1990) (PSID) 1968-1985 Males; aged 20-60
years
None 18%3 15% four
years after























Includes only those separators who had 6+ years of tenure and whose firms’ employment in the year following
their separation was 30% or more below their max level in the 1970s.
2 Men’s losses were greater than women’s but their wages recovered at a faster rate than women’s, post-
displacement.
3 These are losses in weekly earnings. Annual earnings fall by about 40% in the short-term.
4 Displaced due to plant closing or layoffs and not recalled within two years of displacement..
5 These are losses in hourly wages. Annual earnings fall by about 16% in the short-term.
6 Displaced due to plant closing or layoffs in sectors other than construction and agriculture.
7 Represents losses during the period four years prior through five years following displacement.
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Table 1.3: Displaced Workers – Summary Characteristics (DWS 1994-2014)
Worker Characteristics




Retail and Wholesale Trade 15.5
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 8.8
Median Pre-Displacement Tenure (in years) 6.0
Changed Detailed Industry (in %) 64.0
Changed Detailed Occupation (in %) 64.2
Median Weeks Without Work 7.0
Education (in %)





Median Age (in years) 45.0
Males (in %) 55.0
Table 1.4: OLS Vs Quantile Regression Estimates – Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantile Regression Estimates
←− Higher Losses Lower Losses −→
Change in Log Weekly Earnings OLS τ = 0.10 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.90
Pre-Displacement Tenure -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.010***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Changed 3-digit Industry -0.134*** -0.257*** -0.161*** -0.061*** -0.010 -0.014
[0.016] [0.043] [0.023] [0.006] [0.009] [0.026]
Changed 3-digit Occupation -0.070*** -0.188*** -0.124*** -0.046*** -0.013 0.050*
[0.018] [0.041] [0.016] [0.006] [0.008] [0.028]
Years since Displacement 0.040*** 0.077*** 0.046*** 0.015** 0.020*** 0.032**
[0.012] [0.027] [0.009] [0.006] [0.005] [0.013]
Weeks W/o Work after Job Loss -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Displacement Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Predicted Change -0.174 -0.792 -0.380 -0.094 0.116 0.383
Median Predicted Change -0.161 -0.785 -0.367 -0.074 0.135 0.392
Observations 9045 9045 9045 9045 9045 9045
Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 1.5: Quantile Regression Estimates – High School vs College Graduates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantile Regression Estimates
←− Higher Losses Lower Losses −→
Change in Log Weekly Earnings OLS τ = 0.10 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.90
High School Graduates (n=2893)
Pre-Displacement Tenure -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.011***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Changed 3-digit Industry -0.126*** -0.280*** -0.208*** -0.092*** -0.047** -0.017
[0.025] [0.051] [0.030] [0.015] [0.022] [0.045]
Changed 3-digit Occupation -0.086*** -0.154* -0.080*** -0.051*** 0.007 0.043
[0.027] [0.079] [0.027] [0.014] [0.017] [0.048]
Median Predicted Change -0.157 -0.771 -0.378 -0.094 0.124 0.394
College Graduates (n=1903)
Pre-Displacement Tenure -0.015*** -0.029*** -0.018*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*
[0.004] [0.011] [0.005] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004]
Changed 3-digit Industry -0.151*** -0.207** -0.119*** -0.050*** 0.003 -0.034
[0.042] [0.102] [0.020] [0.018] [0.019] [0.037]
Changed 3-digit Occupation -0.113*** -0.373*** -0.127*** -0.034 -0.018 0.078*
[0.042] [0.134] [0.040] [0.021] [0.021] [0.046]
Median Predicted Change -0.194 -0.865 -0.337 -0.043 0.121 0.384
All specifications include displacement year dummies and controls for years since displacement and
weeks without work.
Bootstrapped Standard errors in brackets
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Table 1.6:
Mean Displacement Outcomes by Pre-Displacement Industry Employment Share
Pre-Displacemeny Industry Employment Share (ES)
ES<0.005 0.005<=ES<0.01 0.01<ES<0.02 0.02<=ES<0.06 0.06<=ES
# Displaced Workers 7185 4239 3911 1694 1781
# Switched Industries 0.73 0.66 0. 59 0.52 0.41
(0.72, 0.74) (0.64, 0.67) (0.58, 0.61) (0.49, 0.54) (0.38, 0.43)
Mean -0.32 -0.29 -0.30 -0.22 -0.23
∆ln(Wi) (-0.34, -0.29) (-0.32, -0.25) (-0.33, -0.26) (-0.26, -0.18) (-0.28, -0.18)
95% confidence intervals in parenthesis
Table 1.7: Instrumental Variables – Summary Statistics
Statistics Industry employment Occupation employment Mean industry Mean occupation
share share switch measure switch measure
Mean 0.019 0.015 0.659 0.681
Std. Dev. 0.021 0.016 0.187 0.191
Min 0 0 0 0
Max 0.08 0.072 1 1
N 10728 10719 16637 14465
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Table 1.8: 2SLS First Stage Results
(1) (2)
Dependant Variable Switched Industries Switched Occupations
Mean Proportion of Industry Switchers 0.674*** 0.161***
[0.037] [0.050]
Mean Proportion of Occupation Switchers 0.144*** 0.718***
[0.033] [0.047]
Pre-displacement Industry Share -1.712*** -0.097
[0.434] [0.515]
Pre-displacement Occupation Share -0.411 -0.131
[0.270] [0.545]
Pre-Displacement Tenure -0.002** -0.001
[0.001] [0.001]
Years since displacement 0.010 0.005
[0.008] [0.006]
Weeks without work after lost job -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.0003] [0.0002]
Displacement year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 5939 5939
Clustered standard errors in brackets






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.10: Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression Estimates
IV Quantile Regression Estimates
Change in Log Weekly Earnings 2SLS τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Changed Either Ind or Occ -0.290*** -0.212* -0.061 -0.107
[0.095] [0.118] [0.109] [0.119]
Pre-Displacement Tenure -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.008**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Years since displacement 0.039*** 0.044** 0.010 0.017
[0.013] [0.018] [0.017] [0.018]
Weeks W/o Work -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Displacement year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6386 6386 6386 6386
Standard errors in brackets





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.12: Pre-Displacement Occupation Skill Quartiles – 2SLS Estimates
Pre-Displacement Occupation Skill Quartiles
Change in Log Weekly pay, 2009 $ Quartile I Quartile II Quartile III Quartile IV
Pre-displacement Tenure -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.017***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Changed 3-digit industry -0.603** -0.337*** -0.172*** -0.223
[0.278] [0.103] [0.064] [0.183]
Years since displacement 0.037 0.046* 0.047*** 0.036
[0.032] [0.026] [0.017] [0.029]
Weeks W/o Work after Job Loss -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Median Predicted Change -0.064 -0.121 -0.191 -0.184
Displacement year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1466 2114 2583 2388
Standard errors adjusted for 228 industry clusters in brackets
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Table 1.13: Quantile Regression Estimates by
Pre-Displacement Occupation Skill Quartiles
Pre-Displacement Occupation Skill
Quartile I Quartile II Quartile III Quartile IV
OLS -0.079 -0.147 -0.215 -0.203
2SLS -0.064 -0.121 -0.191 -0.184
τ = 0.10 -0.779 -0.755 -0.888 -0.773
τ = 0.25 -0.319 -0.356 -0.406 -0.386
τ = 0.50 -0.023 -0.076 red-0.103 -0.076
τ = 0.75 0.221 0.119 0.107 0.091
τ = 0.90 0.659 0.387 0.336 0.296
Dependent variable : Change in log weekly earnings (2009$)
Regressions were estimated separately for each skill quartile.
All specifications include displacement year dummies and
controls for tenure, industry-switch, years since













































Figure 1.2: Mean Change in Earnings by Survey Year (1994-2014)
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014















































































p75 Mean Median p25
Notes: p75 and p25 refer to the 75th and the 25th percentile
of the loss distribution
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Figure 1.4: OLS Vs Quantile Regression Point Estimates
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Notes: Solid line indicates quantile regression estimates.
Dotted line indicates OLS point estimates. Grey area rep-
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Appendix A Quantile Regressions
Koenker and Bassett (1978) introduced the concept of regression quantiles in
order to estimate the conditional distribution of a dependent variable. As per the
model, for any real-valued random variable, Y, with a distribution function:
F (y) = P (Y ≤ y), (11)
the τth quantile is defined as:
F−1(τ) = inf{y : F (y) ≥ τ}, (12)
for any 0 < τ < 1. Suppose the loss associated with predicting a point estimate for
this random variable can be described by the following piecewise absolute value loss
function:
ρτ (µ) = µ (τ − I(µ < 0)). (13)
In this case, for some τ ∈ (0, 1) we want to find a predictor of y (ŷ) such that ŷ
minimizes the expected loss:
Eρτ (Y − ŷ) = (τ − 1)
∫ ŷ
−∞
(y − ŷ) dF (x) + τ
∫ ∞
ŷ
(y − ŷ) dF (x). (14)
Differentiating with respect to ŷ, yields:






dF (x) = F (ŷ)− τ. (15)
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I(Yi ≤ y), (16)
the expected loss takes the form:
∫
ρτ (y − ŷ) dFn(y) = n−1
n∑
i=1
ρτ (y − ŷ), (17)
The solution to this loss minimization problem yields the τth sample quantile
(Koenker 2005).
Now, suppose (yi, xi), i = 1, ..., n denotes a sample of size n of displaced
workers, where yi represents the dependent variable, change in log weekly earnings
(∆ln(Wi)), and xi is a K × 1 vector of regressors such as Ti, Di and Xi in equation
(3). In quantile regression models it is assumed that:






βτ + ετi, (19)
is termed as the τth quantile regression equation and τ(yi|xi) = xi
′
βτ denotes the
conditional quantile of ∆ln(Wi) given xi (Buchinsky 1998). In this case β̂τ , the









β̂τ represents the estimate of τth conditional quantile. Each element of the
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estimated coefficient vector β̂τ measures the effect of the corresponding regressor in
xi on ∆ln(Wi) at the τth quantile of ∆ln(Wi) . Therefore, a coefficient estimate on
pre-displacement tenure at τ = 0.25 measures the effect of one additional year of
pre-displacement tenure on earnings change at the 25th quantile of the conditional
earnings change distribution. Because a negative change in earnings implies an earn-
ings loss, 25th quantile of the earnings change distribution corresponds to the 75th
quantile of the earnings loss distribution.
By changing the value of τ between 0 and 1 we can express the entire condi-
tional distribution of the response variable, ∆ln(Wi), in terms of various observed,
independent variables, (xi). Since the model minimizes a weighted sum of absolute
deviations, the estimated coefficients are not sensitive to outliers in ∆ln(Wi), an issue
that plagues the OLS coefficient estimates.
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Appendix B Post-Displacement Losses by Educa-
tion
Table B.1: Estimated earnings losses for High School vs College Graduates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantile Regression Estimates
←− Higher Losses Lower Losses −→
Change in Log Weekly Earnings OLS τ = 0.10 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.90
High School Graduates (n=2893)
Pre-Displacement Tenure -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.011***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Changed 3-digit Industry -0.126*** -0.280*** -0.208*** -0.092*** -0.047** -0.017
[0.025] [0.051] [0.030] [0.015] [0.022] [0.045]
Changed 3-digit Occupation -0.086*** -0.154* -0.080*** -0.051*** 0.007 0.043
[0.027] [0.079] [0.027] [0.014] [0.017] [0.048]
Years since Displacement 0.050*** 0.029 0.050*** 0.022*** 0.033*** 0.032
[0.018] [0.029] [0.019] [0.008] [0.012] [0.022]
Weeks W/o Work after Job Loss -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Median Predicted Change -0.157 -0.771 - 0.378 -0.094 0.124 0.394
Observations 2893 2893 2893 2893 2893 2893
College Graduates (n=1903)
Pre-Displacement Tenure -0.015*** -0.029*** -0.018*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*
[0.004] [0.011] [0.005] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004]
Changed 3-digit Industry -0.151*** -0.207** -0.119*** -0.050*** 0.003 -0.034
[0.042] [0.102] [0.020] [0.018] [0.019] [0.037]
Changed 3-digit Occupation -0.113*** -0.373*** -0.127*** -0.034 -0.018 0.078*
[0.042] [0.134] [0.040] [0.021] [0.021] [0.046]
Years since Displacement 0.076** 0.067 0.050* 0.027 0.022** -0.007
[0.034] [0.059] [0.026] [0.017] [0.009] [0.038]
Weeks W/o Work after Job Loss -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Median Predicted Change -0.194 -0.865 - 0.337 -0.043 0.121 0.384
Observations 1903 1903 1903 1903 1903 1903
All specifications include displacement year dummies.
Bootstrapped Standard errors in brackets
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Appendix C IV - 2SLS Estimates – State Employ-
ment
Table C.2: IV - 2SLS Estimates – State Employment Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV-Full Industry Occ Either
Changed 3-digit industry -0.119*** -0.248* -0.253***
[0.022] [0.127] [0.097]




Tenure at lost job -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Years since displacement 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.051***
[0.012] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014]
Weeks W/o Work after Job Loss -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Displacement year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7345 5838 6782 6173 5838
R2 0.047 0.043 0.042 0.043 0.037
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.033
Standard errors in brackets
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
52
Appendix D The Control Function Approach
D.1 Pre-displacement occupation choice
Any displaced worker i is displaced from an occupation j. I call this the
pre-displacement occupation choice. Occupation j may have been worker i’s first
occupation of employment or he may have moved to occupation j from some other
occupation j0 for any possible reason. This section assumes the latter for expositional
purposes, however, dropping that assumption will not affect the conclusions.
Following Dahl (2002), worker i’s pre-displacement log wage in occupation j
can be expressed as follows:
yij = αj + x
′
iδj + µij (j = 1, ..., N), (21)
where, αj is the occupation specific constant; xi is a vector of individual characteristics
including education, firm-, industry- and occupation-tenure, gender, race, etc; and µij
is an error term. An individual worker’s occupation choice is based on maximization
of utility, which comprises of his earnings as well as other non-wage components such
as occupation match quality, etc.
Vij0j = yij + tij0j (j = 1, ..., N), (22)
where, Vij0j indexes utility associated with movement from j
0 to j; yij is log earnings;
and tij0j is a vector of occupational match quality differences or re-tooling costs
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associated with movement from j0 to j9.
yij − E[yij|xi] = µij (j = 1, ..., N), (23)
tij0j − E[tij0j|zi] = ωij0j (j = 1, ..., N), (24)
where zi is a vector of individual characteristics.
Using (3) and (4), Vij0j can be expressed as:
Vij0j = Vj0j + eij0j (j = 1, ..., N), (25)
where, Vj0j = E[yij|xi] + E[tij0j|zi] is the subutility function, and eij0j = µij + ωij0j.
Workers choose occupations to maximize their utility. Therefore, occupation
j will be chosen based on the following rule:
Mij0j =

1 iff Vij0j = max(Vij01, ..., Vij0N),
0 Otherwise
where, Mij0j indicates if the worker switched from occupation j
0 to j. Therefore,
Mij0j =

1 iff Vj0j + eij0j ≥ Vj0m + eij0m ∀m,
0 Otherwise
The earnings of worker i are observed only for the occupation that he chooses
to work in, that is, the utility maximizing occupation. This implies that individuals
9In case occupation j was the worker’s first occupation then tij0j would simply be the occupation
match quality of j.
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are not randomly assigned to occupations and therefore,
E[µij|yij observed] = E[µij|Mij0j == 1]
= E[µij|eij0m − eij0j ≤ Vj0j − Vj0m, ∀m]
6= 0
(26)
E[µij|Mij0j == 1] represents the selectivity bias in pre-displacement occupa-
tion for worker i. To correct for this selection bias, Dahl (2002) proposes the use of
a single-index model, wherein, the earnings equations can be written as:





{Mij0j × λj0j(pij0j)}+ ωij (j = 1, ..., N), (27)
where, λj0j(·) is the selection correction function for occupation j. For each occupa-
tion j0, this correction function is a function of the probability of the worker’s first
best occupation choice (pij0j), and ωij is a mean zero error term given this occupation
choice probability and Mij0j == 1.
D.2 Post-displacement occupation choice
Once worker i is displaced from his job in occupation j, he again has a de-
cision to make regarding his post-displacement occupation. As a result, the post-
displacement earnings function will also have the selection bias of the form (6) asso-
ciated with occupation choice. Specifically,
yik = αk + x
′
iδk + µik (k = 1, ..., N), (28)
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where, yik is worker i’s post-displacement log earnings in the post-displacement oc-
cupation k. yik is observed only if the worker displaced from occupation j chooses
occupation k, i.e., only if Mijk == 1. As a result,
E[µik|yik observed] = E[µik|Mijk == 1]
= E[µik|eijm − eijk ≤ Vjk − Vjm, ∀m]
6= 0
(29)
E[µij|Mij0j == 1] represents the selectivity bias in post-displacement occupation for
worker i. Using correction function of the form (7) to address this selection pro-
duces the following post-displacement earnings functions for each post-displacement
occupation choice k:





{Mijk × λjk(pijk)}+ ωik (k = 1, ..., N),
(30)
where, pijk is the worker’s first best post-displacement occupation choice probability,
and λjk(·) is an unknown function of this probability.
D.3 Change in earnings post-displacement
From (7) and (10), worker i’s post-displacement change in earnings can be
expressed as:
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where, Ak is an occupation specific constant, Xi is a vector of individual spe-
cific characteristics affecting the post-displacement change in earnings, such as pre-
displacement firm-tenure, an indicator for switching industries, number of weeks with-
out work after displacement, etc., and ωik is a mean zero error term given the first
best pre- and post-displacement occupation choice probabilities pij0j and pijk.
Using DWS data, however, it is impossible to compute worker i’s first best
pre-displacement occupation choice probability, pij0j, because we do not observe the
occupation j0. Due to this limitation, instead of equation (1.23) the following equation
is estimated for each post-displacement occupation choice:





{Mijk × λjk(pijk)}+ θik, (32)
where, θik =
∑N
j0=1{Mij0j × λj0j(pij0j)} +ωik. The losses thus estimated are condi-
tional on the observed pre-displacement occupation and do not correspond to a truly
randomly chosen displaced worker.
D.4 Estimation Procedure
I divide the occupations into five broad categories based on the CPS 1990
classification. These are Managerial and Professional Specialty Occupations, Techni-
cal, Sales and Administrative Support Occupations; Service Occupations; Precision
Production, Craft and Repair Occupations, and Operators, Fabricators and Labor-
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ers. To estimate the loss of firm and industry-specific human capital by displaced
workers, after correcting for worker’s post-displacement occupation selection, I first
compute the probability that an individual worker would follow a given occupation-
to-occupation path. I divide my data set into workers that switched their occupation
category after displacement, and those that didn’t. These workers are further divided
into five education classes. Within each education class, workers are divided into
industry-switchers and industry-stayers. The industry-switchers are computed based
on the 3-digit industry classification as workers that changed their 3-digit industry
upon displacement. Because each occupation-switcher can potentially come from 4
different occupation categories, this assignment leads occupation-switchers to be di-
vided into 40 (= 5× 2× 4) distinct cells. Occupation stayers, on the other hand, are
divided into 10 (= 5× 2) distinct cells.
The probability that any worker will move from one pre-displacement occu-
pation j to another occupation k (∀j, k) is given by the fraction of workers in a cell
that follow that occupation-switch/-stay path. Separate correction functions are then
computed, for each of the occupation categories, using a second order polynomial ex-
pansion of the occupation-switch probabilities. Using these correction functions in
the regression of change in log weekly earnings of displaced workers will eliminate the
selection bias, associated with workers selecting into occupations post-displacement,
inherent in OLS.
D.5 Summary Stats
Table D.1 summarizes the displaced workers by their post-displacement occu-
pation category.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































pation of the workers. Workers employed in service occupations, post-displacement
experienced the largest losses (mean 42% and median 28%). Workers in the manage-
rial occupations had the lowest median losses (less than 5%), though their mean loss
was significantly high at about 27%.
Figure D.1: Earnings Losses by Post-Displacement Occupation Category
Figure D.2 illustrates how the losses vary by occupation category, depending
on if the workers switched industries post-displacement or not. For example, workers
in the technical occupations and laborers experienced similar losses if they didn’t
switch industries, however, switching industries has greater adverse effect on workers
with technical skills than the laborers and operators.
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Chapter 2
Estimating the Impact of
Economic Integration Agreements
in the Presence of Selection Bias
and Firm Heterogeneity Using
Panel Data
Scott Baier and Mallika Garg
2.1 Introduction
For nearly five decades, the gravity model of international trade has been
employed to help quantify the impact of natural and policy induced trade barriers
on bilateral trade flows. In many of the early studies, data limitations restricted
the sample size of countries and constrained the analysis to a cross-section (see for
example Tinbergen (1962), Helpman (1987) and Baier and Bergstrand (2001) as well
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as Baldwin (1994); Oguledo and MacPhee (1994); and Frankel (1997, Ch. 4)).
Over the last 15 years, researchers have been able to expand the number of
countries employed. The increase in the number of countries, however, has created
some theoretical and empirical challenges. As the sample size of countries increased,
the number of bilateral observations where there are zero trade (or unreported trade)
flows has increased dramatically as well. The presence of zeros is well documented in
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) and Tenreyro and Santos Silva (2006). In
their analysis, Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) developed a tractable theo-
retical model that could account for zeros and used a two-step estimator to control
for the presence of zeros in the cross-section. Moreover, the influential work by Ten-
reyro and Santos Silva (2006) showed that the presence of heteroskedastic errors and
zero trade flows could lead to inconsistent ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient
estimates. In order to account for the zero bilateral trade flows, Tenreyro and Santos
Silva employed a pseudo-poisson maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator that would
provide consistent estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
In addition to the instances of zero bilateral trade flows, the additional coun-
tries added also introduced additional heterogeneity. If the unobserved heterogeneity
was unaccounted for, the resulting empirical estimates would be inconsistent. In or-
der to account for this unobserved heterogeneity, a number of studies have used panel
data techniques. Fixed effects or first differencing the data provided a means to ac-
count for the underlying heterogeneity as long as the unobserved effect was constant
or slow moving over time. This was the approach taken in Cheng and Wall (2002),
Rose (2004), Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2004), and Baier and Bergstrand (2007).
In most of these studies using panel techniques, zero bilateral trade flows were typi-
cally ignored. If the unobserved bilateral effects influenced bilateral trade, there will
also likely be unobserved factors that influence the countries’ selection into trading
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with another country. Failure to account for non-random selection will likely result in
inconsistent estimates. While it may seem that this can easily be addressed by using
fixed effects in both the bilateral trade flow equation and the selection equation, we
show that this estimation strategy does not provide consistent estimates.
The primary objective of this paper is to extend the analysis of Helpman,
Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) (HMR hereafter) and to show how to account for
sample selection (incidental truncation) when unobservable factors are present. In
short, the potential contributions of this paper are:
• Provide a set of simple tests to help identify non-random selection (incidental
truncation) in bilateral trade data;
• Extend the empirical framework of HMR to a dynamic setting. Presence of
unobservables in the selection equation imply that zero trade flows cannot be
ignored.
• Show how the coefficients on trade costs are impacted by controlling for selec-
tion.
• In HMR, they argue that bias created due to firm heterogeneity is relatively
more important than selection. We reexamine this argument in a panel data
setting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, we provide de-
scriptive evidence that non-random selection maybe present in the bilateral trade
data. If countries chose to trade with each other randomly, we expect to not see any
trend in trade or no-trade runs, i.e., the length of time a country trades or doesn’t
trade with another country. However, we show that country pairs that trade with
one another, tend to have short breaks in their trade runs. At the same time, there
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are a large number of instances of very short trade runs. Also, presence of a large
fraction of bilateral pairs in any given year with zero bilateral flows points to a sig-
nificant amount of information that needs to be taken into account while estimating
the gravity model.
In Section 2.3, we provide a brief review of the HMR model and develop a
model similar to HMR with the exception that we highlight how unobservables enter
into the selection equation and the trade flow equation, in a panel. Before conducting
empirical tests for the aforementioned selection, Section 2.4 provides details on the
data sources used in this paper. In Section 2.5, we empirically test for non-random
selection in the gravity model using different specifications and allowing for different
time periods. We employ several different tests and in all instances we are unable
to reject the null hypothesis of non-random selection. For instance, if bilateral trade
was indeed random, then a country pair’s decision to trade in one period will not be
affected by whether or not the pair traded in the previous period, or by the decision
to trade in the next period. We find that in all the typical empirical specifications of
the gravity model, including the bilateral fixed effects model, self selection remains a
serious issue.
In Section 2.6, we explain the empirical strategy in greater detail. Employing
techniques used in Wooldridge (1995), and Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) and Val
and Vella (2007), we provide alternative ways to account for the non-random selec-
tion, in a panel of bilateral trade data. A selection correction function is estimated
using religion as the excluded variable that affects selection into bilateral trade, but
doesn’t affect the volume of trade once the selection has been made. In addition
to this, the correction function is modeled to depend on time averages of the truly
exogenous variables that affect trade. We then combine this selection correction func-
tion with HMR’s polynomial correction functions, which control for unobserved firm
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heterogeneity, to estimate a gravity model that will provide consistent, and unbiased
coefficient estimates.
Section 2.7 provides our empirical results. We show that after controlling for
selection and firm heterogeneity, using HMR’s model, the inclusion of bilateral fixed
effects has a modest impact on the measured effects of free trade agreements. This
maybe indicative of the fact that factors that affect selection and firm-heterogeneity
are slow moving over time and the bilateral fixed effects likely capture some of these
effects. However, inclusion of bilateral fixed effects does significantly lower the impact
of other EIAs, pointing towards potential unobservables that remain unaccounted for
in this estimation. Using the correlated random effects model developed in Section
6, we find that free trade agreements between two countries tends to increase the
bilateral trade flow by about 71.6%, on average. Compared to the baseline gravity
estimation, the effect of membership into custom union and economic union is to
almost double the bilateral trade flows, once proper selection correction is employed.
Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Bilateral Trade Flow Data at a Glance
Though bilateral trade has grown considerably, over the past decades, the
growth is not stochastic. There are still several instances of zero trade flows between
country pairs. Figure 2.1, for instance, shows the fraction of bilateral pairs that had
positive trade flows in years 1970-2010. In 1970, almost 50% of dyads had zero trade
flows. Even until early 1990s, only 60% of the country pairs had positive trade flows.
In the last two decades, the fraction of bilateral pairs that are trading has increased,
but about 20% of the bilateral pairs still have zero trade flows.
Figure 2.2 shows the length of different periods in which countries are trading.
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For example, a trade run of one means in any period t − 1 the country pair did not
trade, in period t the pair reported to have traded, and in period t+ 1 their bilateral
trade was back to zero. A trade run of two, similarly, implies that in period t − 1
the country pair did not trade, in periods t and t + 1 the pair had positive bilateral
trade flows, and in period t+ 2 their bilateral trade was back to zero, and so on. The
concentration of trade runs on the left hand side of the graph implies that countries
that are not frequently trading make up a significant portion in our panel with about
66% of times the trade run being 5 years or less. The spike at 41 shows the number
of pairs that reported positive bilateral trade flows for the entire 40 years period of
1970-2010.
Figure 2.3, similarly, shows the length of different periods in which a bilateral
pair is not trading. For example, a no-trade run of one means in period t− 1 a pair
did trade, in period t it did not trade, and in period t + 1 it traded again. A run of
two implies in period t − 1 the pair did trade, in period t and t + 1 it did not trade
and in period t + 2 it traded again, and so on. The main takeaway from this figure
is that among countries that select to trade with each other, there are breaks in the
data but the breaks tend to be for relatively short duration. About 72% of the times
the break is less than or equal to five years.
These figures, therefore, provide descriptive evidence for the fact that bilateral
trade between two countries isn’t a random phenomenon. A large fraction of bilateral
pairs do not trade with one another, in any given year. The countries that do select
into trading with one another, usually trade for long periods of time, and the breaks,
when they do occur, are relatively shorter in duration.
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2.3 Theoretical Extension to the HMR Model
We assume that agent’s preferences can be characterized by the standard con-
stant elasticity of substitution utility function. Exports are subject to standard ice-
berg trade costs and firms must incur fixed bilateral export costs. As in HMR, we
assume that firms are heterogeneous and that firm’s productivity is drawn from a

















where Wit is the wage rate of country i at time t, τij represents iceberg trade
costs, Ait is a measure of aggregate productivity in country i at time t, WjtLjt is the
aggregate income in country j at time t, Pjt is the price index, F
∗
ijf represents the
fixed cost of exporting from country i to country j at time t, ε is the trade elasticity,
and ϕ∗ijt is the zero cut-off productivity at time t.
As in HMR, it can be the case that bilateral trade from i to j is zero. This
occurs when it is not profitable for any firm to trade. This would happen if a firm in
country i received the highest draw from the distribution, in which case it would not




































(ε− 1)[ln(ϕH)− ln(ϕ∗ijt)] > 0
]
(2.5)
where 1[.] is an indicator function indicating a country i’s selection into trading with
country j.
With Nijt potentially active firms, bilateral trade between i and j at time t
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In order to estimate the model, we need to specify the functional forms of the
trade costs function. We assume that the iceberg trade costs are given by the standard
set of gravity covariates (xijt), which include variables that may be correlated with the
unobserved bilateral, time invariant, component (aij) and an idiosyncratic component
that is uncorrelated with other measures of trade costs (ετijt), that is
τ ε−1ijt = exp
(





where, ετijt ∼ N(0, σ2τ ).
As in HMR, we assume that the bilateral fixed costs can be modeled with
importer-year (θjt), exporter-year fixed effects (θit), a vector of bilateral trade cost
variables that influence fixed costs (wijt), unobserved factors that may be correlated
with the selection decision (θij), and an unobserved component that is uncorrelated
with other variables in the selection equation (εFijt)
F ∗ijt = exp
(






where, εFijt ∼ N(0, σ2F ).
With these functional forms the selection equation can be expressed as follows:
Sijt = 1
[
xijtβ + wijtγ + κit + κjt + κij + εijt > 0
]
(2.11)
where, κit and κjt are exporter and importer-year fixed effects, κij = aij+θij represents
the time-invariant bilateral unobservable factors that affect selection, and εijt = ε
τ
ijt+
εFijt and εijt ∼ N(0, σ2τ +σ2F ) represents the truly random shocks influencing selection.
It is the presence of κij in this selection equation that complicates the estimation
of a gravity-type model since these unobservable bilateral factors affect not only the
probability that the countries trade, but are also correlated with the unobservables
that affect the volume of such trade. That is, κij is potentially correlated with cij –
the unobserved bilateral characteristics affecting trade flow (tfijt) from country i to
country j in year t. These trade flows can be modeled as follows:
tfijt = xijtβ+ wijtγ+ δit + δjt + cij + εijt (2.12)
where δit and δjt are the exporter and importer fixed effects, and εijt is an idiosyncratic
error term.
Let the probability that country i selects country j as an export destination in
any given year t be denoted by sijt, which has a standard normal distribution. Then
following HMR,
Pr(Sijt = 1| observables) = Φ(xijtβ∗ + wijtγ∗ + κ∗it + κ∗jt) (2.13)
A standard way to correct for selection bias is to use the predicted probabilities,
ˆpijt, from the Probit equation of the type (2.13) to estimate inverse Mills ratio, λ̂( ˆpijt)
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(Heckman (1979)). The inverse Mills ratio is then added to the gravity model as
an explanatory variable to control for the unobservables cij. However, as pointed
out by HMR, this control for selection doesn’t account for the biases introduced by
heterogeneity in firm productivity, which affects an individual firm’s export decision.
To control for firm-heterogeneity, HMR show that a polynomial correction function
of ˆ̄Z(λ̂(.)) may be used, in addition to the inverse Mills ratio, to yield consistent
coefficients estimates for the standard gravity variables, in a cross-section of bilateral
trade data. That is, they estimate a model of the form:
tfij = xijβ+ wijγ+ δi + δj + λ̂( ˆpijt)η0 +
ˆ̄Z(.)η1 +
ˆ̄Z(.)2η2 +
ˆ̄Z(.)3η3 + εij (2.14)
In a panel setting, the logical way to extend HMR’s analysis would be to
estimate the Probit equation (2.13) for each time period t and then estimating λ(.)
and polynomials of ˆ̄Z(.) to control for selection and firm heterogeneity. Wooldridge
(2000), however, cautions against using the inverse Mills ratio to correct for the
selection bias in a panel setting of the form equation (2.12) (though it is a good test
for the presence of selection bias as highlighted in an upcoming section). The presence
of unobserved κij in the selection equation (2.11) implies that the error term εijt will
be potentially serially correlated leading to inconsistent estimation (see Wooldridge
(2000) for details). Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) develop an empirical strategy
to control for non-random selection in panel data in the presence of endogenous
explanatory variables, using assumptions similar to Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain
(1980). Section 2.6 outlines this strategy in the context of the gravity model and the
estimation of bilateral trade flows where certain measures of trade costs (such as
presence of EIAs) are endogenous.
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2.4 Data Sources
Annual bilateral trade flows data for 1970-2002 extracted from the UN Com-
trade database, available at http://comtrade.un.org/data/, are used for our esti-
mations. We use importer’s reported value for bilateral trade. If there is no re-
ported value for imports, we use the exporter’s reported value. The gravity con-
trol variables for distance, contiguity, legal origin, language and colonial relation-
ship are from CEPII’s geography databases – GeoDist and Gravity – available at
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/bdd.asp. The dummy variables for the
level of EIAs between country pairs are created using the dataset constructed by Baier
and Bergstrand located at http://kellogg.nd.edu/faculty/fellows/bergstrand.shtml.
The data on religion, which is used to satisfy the exclusion restriction in Sec-
tion 6, are from the Correlates of War’s World Religion database available at
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
data-sets/world-religion-data2.
2.5 Tests for Incidental Truncation
Accounting for the effects of Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs) on bi-
lateral trade flows has been a challenge for empirical work in international trade.
Part of this challenge arises from the endogeneity of the EIA dummy variables that
are typically used to capture the trade creating effects of the respective agreements.
The widely employed approach to account for this potential endogeniety is the use
of bilateral fixed effects. On the assumption that the unobservable country pair spe-
cific factors that affect EIAs between the two countries are slow moving over time,
employing bilateral fixed effects allow for a more precise estimation of the gravity
2See Appendix A for summary statistics of these gravity variables.
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model. While we have used the HMR model to highlight selection in panel settings,
we also show that selection is likely an issue in many of the commonly used empir-
ical specifications of the gravity model. Table 2.1 provides the estimates from the
baseline gravity model using panel data. Column (1) provides results when a pooled
OLS estimation is performed without including bilateral fixed effects, while column
(2) provides results using bilateral fixed effects.
Controlling for the time-constant unobserved heterogeneity has a significant
affect on the coefficient estimates of the four types of EIAs – Free Trade Agreements
(FTA), Custom Unions (CU), Common Markets (CM), and Economic Unions (EU).
For example, the average treatment effect (ATE) of FTA on bilateral trade flows
goes up from being statistically insignificant and negative using pooled OLS to a
43% (e0.356 = 1.43) increase. Most notable difference is in the ATE of CMs on the
bilateral trade flows. Correcting for unobserved heterogeneity increases the effect of
common markets from a 49% (e−0.665 = 0.51) decrease in trade to more than doubling
(e0.836 = 2.31) of trade between the country pairs. The ATEs of custom union and
economic union on bilateral trade flows also increase substantially. These results are
in line with what Baier and Bergstrand (2007) report using bilateral and country-
and-time fixed effects.
The baseline estimation, however, ignores the instances of zero trade flows.
This will not be a problem if a bilateral country pair’s decision to trade was random.
However, it is likely that the unobserved heterogeneity that affects the two coun-
tries’ decision to select into an EIA (like domestic policy environment), also affects
their decision to trade. In the presence of such non-random selection, the estimation
results employing bilateral fixed effects will be potentially biased and inconsistent.
We apply several selection tests as proposed by Semykina and Wooldridge (2010)
and Wooldridge (1995) to detect if non-random selection or incidental truncation is
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a problem in the estimation of the gravity model using panel data.
If selection was random then corr(εijt, Sijs) = 0 for all t 6= s. Therefore, a
simple test for selection is to add a lag (or a lead) of the selection indicator, i.e., Sijt−1
(or Sijt+1), to the estimable model, and perform a t-test for the significance of this
added variable. Columns (1) and (2) in Tables 2.2a and 2.2b report results from this
test. In Table 2.2a, the baseline gravity model is estimated without controlling for
bilateral fixed effects, while Table 2.2b employs these bilateral fixed effects. In both
the cases, Lag Tij as well as Forward Tij, where Tij is a dummy variable indicating
if the bilateral pair traded in a given year, are statistically significant. There is,
therefore, strong evidence that bilateral trade flow in any year is higher for those
that traded with each other in the previous year, and next year’s decision to trade
bilaterally is positively correlated with the volume of trade in the current year.
Further evidence of selection is provided in columns (3) and (4) of Tables 2.2a
and 2.2b, where a probit model is used to estimate the selection equation for each
time period. The estimates from this step are then used to compute inverse Mills
ratio, which is added to the baseline gravity model in the second stage in column (3).
This allows us to test for contemporaneous correlation between the unobservables
and the bilateral pair’s decision to trade with one another. In column (4), we add
interactions of the inverse Mills ratio with the time dummies to allow the correlation
between the unobservables and the selection indicator to vary with time. Under the
null hypothesis of no non-random selection, the inverse Mills ratio and its interaction
with time should not be statistically significant in the gravity equation. However,
in both the estimations of the baseline gravity model (that is, estimation with and
without the bilateral fixed effects) , the inverse Mills ratio terms are statistically
significant indicating that selection is a problem when using a panel of bilateral trade
data and ignoring the zero trade flows.
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Comparing the results from Table 2.2a with 2.2b, we can also conclude that
simply using bilateral fixed effects to control for the bilateral pair’s selection into
an EIA doesn’t control for their selection into trading with one another. Selection
continues to remain a problem despite employing bilateral fixed effects. Furthermore,
a comparison between the coefficient estimates in Table 2.1, column (2) and Table
2.2b reveals that merely adding the controls to test for selection have a significant
impact on the estimated trade creating effects of the various EIAs. However, simply
adding the inverse Mills ratio terms to the estimation doesn’t produce consistent
estimators (See Wooldridge (1995)) and hence further corrections are required.
2.6 Selection Correction Function




0 + δit + δjt + cij + µijt, t = 1, ..., T (2.15)
where x0ijt is a vector of all observable, exogenous as well as endogenous, factors that
affect bilateral trade flows from country i to j in year t, cij is the time-constant
unobservable bilateral effect, δit, δjt are exporter- importer-year fixed effects, and µijt
is an idiosyncratic error term. The selection decision Sijt = 1 depends on the latent














w0ijt is a vector of instruments that are strictly exogenous conditional on cij, κ
0
ij is the
unobserved effect and µsijt is an idiosyncratic error term. All exogenous elements of
x0ijt are included in w
0
ijt. It is assumed that w
0
ijt are observed for all t, while tfijt is
observed only if Sijt = 1.
To obtain a valid correction function for the non-random selection, Semykina
and Wooldridge (2010) assume that the unobserved effect (cij) in equation (2.15) is





0 + a0ij (2.18)




0 + δit + δjt + w̄
0
ijξ
0 + ν0ijt, t = 1, ..., T (2.19)
where, ν0ijt = a
0
ij +µijt. In the presence of non-random selection, the estimable model




0 + δit + δjt + w̄
0
ijξ
0 + E(ν0ijt|w0ij, Sijt) + ζijt, t = 1, ..., T (2.20)
where, E(ζijt|w0ij, Sijt) = 0. Under certain parametric assumptions (discussed below)
we can estimate the exact expression for E(ν0ijt|w0ij). Once we know E(ν0ijt|w0ij),
applying pooled-2SLS to equation (2.20) will provide selection-corrected, consistent
estimates in the gravity model.
In order to estimate E(ν0ijt|w0ij), we model the correlation between κij and w0ij
in equation (2.17) using the set up in Mundlak (1978) as follows
κij = w̄
0
ijξ + aij (2.21)
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0 + w̄0ijξ + νijt > 0
]
(2.22)
where, νijt = aij + µ
s
ijt, and νijt ∼ N(0, σ2a + σ2µ). Under the assumption that
E(ν0ijt|w0ij, νijt) ≡ E(a0ij + µijt|w0ij, νijt) = E(a0ij + µijt|νijt) = γct νijt, t = 1, ..., T
(2.23)




0 + δit + δjt + w̄
0
ijξ
0 + γctE(νijt|w0ij, Sijt) + ζijt, t = 1, ..., T (2.24)




0 + δit + δjt + w̄
0
ijξ
0 + γctλijt + ζijt, t = 1, ..., T (2.25)
where λijt is the inverse Mills ratio, which can be estimated for each time period using
the Probit equation derived from (2.22)3. The estimated inverse Mills ratio (λ̂ijt) can
then be interacted with year dummies to generate separate coefficients estimates of
γct for each t. In order to also control for firm level heterogeneity, which affects the
proportion of firms that trade in any given year, polynomial correction function of
the form in HMR ( ˆ̄Z(.)) needs to be added to the estimation of the gravity equation.
3To not impose the restriction σ2
ν
≡ σ2a + σ2µ = 1, the coefficients in (2.22) are divided by σ2ν (See
HMR.
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Steps to control for non-random selection and firm hetero-
geneity in a panel of bilateral trade flows
• For each year t estimate a Probit of Sijt. Using the predicted probabilities from
these estimations, obtain an estimate of the inverse Mills ratio (λ̂ijt).
• Use λ̂ijt to estimate the correction function for firm heterogeneity as in HMR
( ˆ̄Z(.)) and its polynomials.










ˆ̄Z(.)3η3+ζijt, t = 1, ..., T
(2.26)
2.7 Estimation Results
Our estimation results are divided into two parts. In the first part, we replicate
HMR’s correction for selection and firm heterogeneity in a panel setting using Pooled
2SLS with time-varying Probit equations in the first stage. This estimation is carried
out separately for specifications with and without bilateral fixed effects. We show
that after correcting for both selection and firm heterogeneity, adding bilateral fixed
effects doesn’t significantly change the marginal effect of free trade agreements on
bilateral trade flows. In the second part, we estimate the model using time-varying
Probit equations in the first stage with correlated random effects (CRE) in the second
stage. This process, as discussed in previous sections, provides consistent estimates
of the marginal effects in the gravity model.
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2.7.1 HMR Model in a Panel Setting
To estimate the HMR model in a panel setting, in the first stage, we estimate a
time varying Probit equation for the selection of bilateral pairs into trading with one
another. We use standard gravity variables to estimate this selection equation and find
that variables that are typically used to explain the volume of trade between nations,
also affect the probability of these countries selecting into a trading relationship with
each other. The countries that are closer to one another, and share common religion,
legal system, border, language and colonial history are more likely to select to trade
with one another4.
In the second stage, we use the results from the first stage Probits to estimate
the inverse Mills ratio and the polynomials of ˆ̄Z(.). The former is used to correct
for unobserved selection and the latter is used to control for unobserved firm-level
heterogeneity in the data. For the second stage estimation to be identified, there
needs to be at least one explanatory variable in the first stage that can be excluded
from the second. A variable that affects a country’s extensive margin of trade with
another country, but not the intensive margin, will be a good excluded variable for the
second stage. HMR show that religion is one such variable which significantly affects
a bilateral pair’s fixed costs of trading but is not correlated with the unobservables
in the second stage. We, therefore, exclude religion from the second stage.
The estimates from the second stage are presented in Table 2.3. All specifi-
cations include exporter- and importer-year fixed effects, and robust standard errors
are reported in parenthesis. Columns (1) and (2) present results from Pooled 2SLS
estimation without adding controls for bilateral fixed effects. Specification in Column
(2) is similar to that in column (1) with the addition of time varying selection effects
4The results from these probits are presented in Appendix B.
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given by the interaction of inverse Mills ratio with year dummies. The results are
similar to HMR’s findings. The coefficient estimates on the inverse Mills ratio (and its
interactions) and the polynomials of ˆ̄Z(.) are all statistically significant. Compared
to the baseline specification in Table 2.1 Column (1), controlling for selection and
firm-heterogeneity significantly improves the coefficient estimates on the EIAs. The
coefficients are now precisely estimated: free trade agreements, on average, increase
bilateral trade flows by 60% (e0.473 = 1.604) compared to a negative effect in the
baseline equation. Similarly, custom union, common market, and economic union
memberships have significant effects on bilateral trade flows, ceteris paribus. While
common market, and economic union memberships almost double the bilateral trade,
country pairs in custom union see trade go up by over 5 times, on average. Therefore,
firm heterogeneity and unobserved selection may be biasing the measured effects of
EIAs. EIAs have significant effect on bilateral trade flows among the countries that
select to trade bilaterally and this effect gets lost when we don’t control for the non-
random selection. Furthermore, comparing these results with Columns (3) and (4) of
Table 2.2a, we find that unobserved heterogeneity also significantly affects the mea-
surement of the marginal effects. Ignoring this heterogeneity biases the estimates
because the proportion of firms exporting from a country does affect the volume of
trade.
Selection and firm heterogeneity may also be correlated with regulations and
other unobserved components discussed in Baier and Bergstrand (2001). Columns
(3) and (4) in Table 2.3 replicate the specification from columns (1) and (2) with
the addition of bilateral fixed effects. All the selection and heterogeneity controls
remain statistically significant. The coefficient estimates on EIAs are all precisely
estimated, however, they are not statistically different from the baseline bilateral
fixed effects estimation of Table 2.1 Column (2). This maybe reflective of the fact
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that factors that affect selection and firm-heterogeneity are slow moving over time
and the bilateral fixed effects were likely capturing the effect of these factors as well.
Comparing Columns (3) and (4) with (1) and (2) of Table 2.3, adding bilateral fixed
effects doesn’t have any significant effect on the marginal effect of free trade agree-
ments, once controls for non-random selection and unobservable heterogeneity are
already added. However, the coefficient estimates on all the other types of EIAs fall
drastically, indicating that a significant amount of unobservable factors still remain
unaccounted for. Also, as discussed previously, the estimates from this specification
are potentially inconsistent. We, therefore, use correlated random effects model us-
ing the procedure described by Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) and elaborated in
Section 2.6 to estimate the marginal effects of EIAs on trade flows.
2.7.2 Correlated Random Effects Estimation
To consistently estimate the effects of EIAs, a Pooled 2SLS model is estimated
with a first stage estimation of time varying Probit equation for selection into a trading
relationship, and a correlated random effects model of the form equation (2.26) in the
second stage. The first stage estimation is similar to that in the previous section. In
the second stage, in addition to the estimated inverse Mills ratio, controls are added
for time averages of the various EIAs to control for non-random selection. The results
from this estimation procedure are reported in Table 2.4.
Columns (1) and (2) use this selection correction process without and with
time varying inverse Mills ratio controls. All the standard gravity variables have the
expected sign, except for islands. Exports from country i to country j are larger,
closer i is to j and if i and j share a border, legal systems, language and colonial
heritage. Compared to the baseline estimates from Table 2.1 Column (1), the esti-
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mated marginal effects of EIA become significant, both statistically and economically.
Free trade agreement between two countries tends to increase the bilateral trade flow
by about 84%, on average. Membership into custom union and economic union is
associated with almost doubling of bilateral trade flows. Membership into a common
market increases bilateral trade flows by about 5 times.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.4 control for unobserved firm heterogeneity,
along with non-random selection. The heterogeneity coefficient estimates are all sta-
tistically significant, and adding these controls reduces the effect of various EIAs
(except custom union, which is marginally higher) on the volume of exports between
country pairs. Ignoring these unobservables, therefore, biases the marginal effect of
EIAs on trade flows as these variables capture some of the trade creating effects of the
unobserved productivity parameters that increase the proportion of firms exporting
in a country.
All the gravity variables have the expected effect on bilateral trade flows (ex-
cept the island indicator). Bilateral trade is higher among geographically closer coun-
tries with similar legal and colonial origins, and common official language. Compared
to the typical bilateral fixed effects estimation of the gravity model (Table 2.1 Col-
umn (2)), the marginal effect of a free trade agreement on bilateral exports goes up
by 52%, once non-random selection and unobserved heterogeneity are properly con-
trolled for. Bilateral exports between countries with a free trade agreement are 72%
higher, on average, than countries without such agreement, ceteris paribus. A custom
union has the effect of almost doubling the bilateral exports. This effect was smaller
at about 70% increase in volume of bilateral exports when using only bilateral fixed
effects to control for unobservables. The effect of common market membership on
bilateral trade flows remains implausibly large, with bilateral exports increasing 2.6
times. The effect of economic union remains about same after correcting for selection
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and heterogeneity at about a 93% increase in bilateral exports.
Figure 2.4 summarizes the coefficient estimates on various EIAs in this and
the previous sections. As previously mentioned, using only the inverse Mills ratio
to correct for non-random selection leads to significantly biased estimates, as shown
by the HMR bars. Controlling for bilateral fixed effects after correcting for selection
and unobserved heterogeneity, doesn’t have any measurable impact on the magnitude
of these effects, when compared with the estimates using only bilateral fixed effects
in a pooled OLS. Properly correcting for selection using a correlated random effects
model has a measurable effect on the size of these effects. Controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity using HMR correction functions along with correlated random effects
further eliminates some of the bias and yields consistent coefficient estimates for the
effects of EIAs on bilateral trade flows.
2.8 Conclusion
Using gravity equation to model trade flows between countries has been the
standard way to estimate the effects of various trade barriers on trade for nearly five
decades. Over the years, more and more bilateral trade data have become readily
available. This has made it possible for trade economists to model the gravity equa-
tion in a panel data setting. However, these data suffer from several limitations.
There are numerous instances of zero- or one-way trade flows where either a bilat-
eral pair doesn’t trade at all or trade is only in one direction. Ignoring these zeroes
could lead to inconsistent OLS coefficient estimates. Furthermore, the trade data are
characterized by significant heterogeneity across countries. Not accounting for the
unobserved heterogeneity would also lead the empirical estimates to be inconsistent.
Ignoring these aspects of bilateral trade would mean throwing away significant in-
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formation about selection. Countries select their trading partners based on several
characteristics. Some of these characteristics are observable to the econometrician but
their also exist several unobservable characteristics that impact selection. Ignoring
this kind of non-random selection is likely to potentially bias the estimates from the
gravity model.
In this paper, we provide empirical tests to show that selection is a problem
in bilateral trade data. We use several tests for selection, based on Semykina and
Wooldridge (2010), on several different specifications of the gravity model. In all
the typical empirical specifications of the gravity model we fail to reject the null
hypothesis of non-random selection. We then provide a way to correct for both the
issues – selection and unobserved heterogeneity – to provide consistent estimates of
the effect of various EIAs on bilateral trade flows. We build on the model of HMR to
incorporate selection and firm-heterogeneity in a panel setting. We then employ the
empirical strategy outlined in Wooldridge (1995), Semykina and Wooldridge (2010),
and Val and Vella (2007), to consistently estimate the gravity equation of trade using
time varying probits in the first stage and correlated random effects model in the
second stage.
We show that after controlling for selection and firm heterogeneity, the in-
clusion of bilateral fixed effects doesn’t significantly impact the effect of free trade
agreements. This maybe because some of the factors that affect selection and firm-
heterogeneity are slow moving over time and are also correlated with unobservables,
such as domestic regulation, that are captured by bilateral fixed effects. However,
inclusion of bilateral fixed effects does significantly lower the impact of other EIAs,
pointing towards potential unobservables that remain unaccounted for in this estima-
tion. Once proper selection correction is employed, and unobserved heterogeneity is
accounted for, we find that free trade agreements, on average, increase bilateral trade
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by 72%, while membership into custom union and economic union almost doubles the
bilateral trade flows.
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Table 2.1: Baseline Panel Gravity Equation: Pooled OLS vs Bilateral Fixed Effects
Log Real Bilateral Trade Flow (1) (2)















Free Trade Agreement -0.013 0.356***
(0.047) (0.048)
Custom Union 0.366*** 0.533***
(0.086) (0.098)
Common Market -0.665*** 0.836***
(0.099) (0.096)




Exporter Year Yes Yes
Importer year Yes Yes
Observations 87599 87599
R-squared 0.722 0.870
Adjusted R-squared 0.715 0.840
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%;
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2.2a: Panel Gravity Equation: Testing for Selection – Pooled OLS/2SLS
Log Real Bilateral Trade Flow (1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance -1.373*** -1.367*** -1.510*** -1.455***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Contiguous 0.445*** 0.452*** 0.549*** 0.557***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053)
Legal 0.229*** 0.256*** 0.213*** 0.210***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Island 0.352*** 0.346*** 0.381*** 0.373***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045)
Landlocked 0.378*** 0.416*** 0.445*** 0.405***
(0.072) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076)
Language 0.515*** 0.526*** 0.677*** 0.632***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
Colonial Relation 1.110*** 1.155*** 1.209*** 1.239***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.071) (0.071)
Free Trade Agreement 0.092* -0.083 0.061 0.081
(0.047) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057)
Custom Union 0.502*** 0.193** 1.165*** 1.104***
(0.086) (0.091) (0.106) (0.107)
Common Market -0.380*** -0.627*** 0.091 0.050
(0.098) (0.114) (0.177) (0.177)
Economic Union 0.037 0.000 0.466** 0.372*







Time and Mills Ratio Interactions:
Time Period 1 0.008
(0.088)
Time Period 2 0.339***
(0.085)
Time Period 3 0.260***
(0.085)
Time Period 4 0.144*
(0.085)
Time Period 5 0.021
(0.085)
Time Period 6 -0.222***
(0.085)
Time Period 7 0.174*
(0.091)
Time Period 8 0.343***
(0.097)
Time Period 9 0.229**
(0.094)
Constant 14.869 6.784*** 15.312 24.538***
(10691.771) (0.950) (29438.977) (0.312)
Exporter Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79334 75137 75762 75762
R-squared 0.732 0.719 0.675 0.676
Adjusted R-squared 0.725 0.712 0.665 0.666
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%; Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2.2b: Panel Gravity Equation: Testing for Selection – Bilateral Fixed Effects
Log of Real Bilateral Trade Flow (1) (2) (3) (4)
Free Trade Agreement 0.390*** 0.329*** 0.316*** 0.280***
(0.050) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059)
Custom Union 0.521*** 0.462*** 0.609*** 0.558***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.122) (0.122)
Common Market 0.860*** 0.747*** 0.687*** 0.749***
(0.100) (0.108) (0.161) (0.162)
Economic Union 0.707*** 0.000 0.496*** 0.453**







Time and Mills Ratio Interactions:
Time Period 1 0.558***
(0.083)
Time Period 2 0.737***
(0.082)
Time Period 3 0.541***
(0.084)
Time Period 4 0.414***
(0.084)
Time Period 5 0.294***
(0.082)
Time Period 6 0.152*
(0.084)
Time Period 7 0.032
(0.091)
Time Period 8 -0.149
(0.108)
Time Period 9 -0.406***
(0.114)
Constant 7.397*** 6.959*** 6.814*** 7.778***
(0.084) (0.073) (0.316) (0.034)
Exporter Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79334 75137 75762 75762
R-squared 0.877 0.875 0.847 0.848
Adjusted R-squared 0.846 0.843 0.806 0.807
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%; Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2.3: Panel Gravity Equation with Selection and Firm Heterogeneity – HMR
(1) (2) (3) (4)













Colonial Relation 1.039*** 1.034***
(0.051) (0.051)
Free Trade Agreement 0.464*** 0.473*** 0.382*** 0.346***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.059) (0.059)
Custom Union 1.782*** 1.823*** 0.677*** 0.636***
(0.108) (0.108) (0.122) (0.123)
Common Market 1.067*** 1.035*** 0.762*** 0.789***
(0.088) (0.088) (0.162) (0.162)
Economic Union 1.062*** 1.082*** 0.478*** 0.453**
(0.215) (0.215) (0.183) (0.183)
ˆ̄Z 3.167*** 3.232*** 1.906*** 1.657***
(0.192) (0.192) (0.212) (0.217)
ˆ̄Z2 -0.493*** -0.511*** -0.487*** -0.431***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.066) (0.067)
ˆ̄Z3 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.036***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Inverse Mills Ratio 1.047*** 0.835*** 1.054*** 1.076***
(0.077) (0.115) (0.095) (0.117)
Time and Mills Ratio Interactions:
Time Period 2 0.433*** 0.224**
(0.130) (0.099)
Time Period 3 0.314** 0.041
(0.131) (0.101)
Time Period 4 0.125 -0.091
(0.127) (0.102)
Time Period 5 0.070 -0.210**
(0.124) (0.102)
Time Period 6 0.009 -0.297***
(0.124) (0.103)
Time Period 7 0.213* -0.366***
(0.127) (0.110)
Time Period 8 0.392*** -0.432***
(0.133) (0.122)
Time Period 9 0.628*** -0.573***
(0.136) (0.129)
Constant 7.191 11.772*** 4.891*** 5.822***
(.) (0.432) (0.337) (0.251)
Exporter Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 75762 75762 75762 75762
R-squared 0.685 0.685 0.848 0.848
Adjusted R-squared 0.676 0.676 0.807 0.807
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%; Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2.4: Panel Gravity Equation: Correlated Random Effects Estimation
Log Real Bilateral Trade Flow (1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance -1.560*** -1.564*** -0.829*** -0.821***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.028)
Contiguous 0.521*** 0.520*** 0.795*** 0.797***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055)
Legal 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.149*** 0.148***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Island 0.373*** 0.374*** 0.316*** 0.317***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Landlocked 0.440*** 0.439*** 0.197*** 0.195***
(0.074) (0.073) (0.071) (0.071)
Language 0.687*** 0.689*** 0.068** 0.062*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032)
Colonial Relation 1.140*** 1.138*** 1.068*** 1.071***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.050) (0.050)
Free Trade Agreement 0.611*** 0.617*** 0.563*** 0.540***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.057) (0.057)
Custom Union 0.619*** 0.670*** 0.702*** 0.683***
(0.152) (0.152) (0.142) (0.142)
Common Market 1.808*** 1.782*** 1.283*** 1.298***
(0.135) (0.135) (0.115) (0.116)
Economic Union 0.722*** 0.724*** 0.673*** 0.660***
(0.236) (0.236) (0.225) (0.225)
Mills Ratio 0.474*** 0.386*** 1.194*** 1.234***







Time and Mills Ratio Interactions:
Time Period 2 0.298** 0.276**
(0.136) (0.129)
Time Period 3 0.205 0.132
(0.136) (0.131)
Time Period 4 0.083 -0.043
(0.132) (0.127)
Time Period 5 -0.051 -0.104
(0.130) (0.124)
Time Period 6 -0.230* -0.274**
(0.129) (0.124)
Time Period 7 0.067 -0.194
(0.132) (0.128)
Time Period 8 0.281** -0.175
(0.138) (0.134)
Time Period 9 0.227 -0.203
(0.141) (0.140)
Constant 15.930 25.315*** 6.180 12.547***
(.) (0.252) (7835.934) (0.481)
Exporter Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Time-Varying FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 75762 75762 75762 75762
R-squared 0.677 0.677 0.688 0.688
Adjusted R-squared 0.667 0.667 0.679 0.679
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%; Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Figure 2.1: Fraction of Bilateral Pairs Trading
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Figure 2.2: Trade Run of Bilateral Pairs (1970-2010)
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Figure 2.3: No-Trade Run of Bilateral Pairs (1970-2010)
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Notes: BFE=Bilateral fixed effects; Pooled estimation results are from Table
1; HMR, HMR+BFE from Table 2.3 columns (2) and (4) – HMR controls for
selection and heterogeneity; CRE, CRE+HMR from Table 2.4 columns (2) and




Appendix A Gravity Variables Summary
Table 5: Summary statistics of the Gravity Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Distance 8.739 0.806 2.134 9.886 147456
Contiguity 0.02 0.139 0 1 147456
Legal 0.389 0.488 0 1 147456
Island 0.044 0.206 0 1 147456
Landlocked 0.022 0.147 0 1 147456
Language 0.167 0.373 0 1 147456
Colonial Relation 0.014 0.118 0 1 147456
Religion 0.178 0.252 0 1 147456
Free Trade Agreement 0.018 0.133 0 1 147456
Custom Union 0.005 0.071 0 1 147456
Common Market 0.004 0.063 0 1 147456
Economic Union 0.001 0.035 0 1 147456
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